Buying a stairway to heaven. The ECB's unconventional monetary policy by GABELLINI, TOMMASO
Buying a Stairway to Heaven
The ECB’s unconventional monetary policy
Tommaso Gabellini
Supervisor: Prof. Giovanni Dosi
4 October 2016
Universita` di Pisa - Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna
Dipartimento di Economia e Management
Master of Science in Economics
2
Contents
Introduction 11
1 Of money, liquidity and inflation 15
1.1 The Quantity Theory of Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Banks and the money supply process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3 Critiques to the Quantity Theory of Money . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3.1 The banking sector reconsidered . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4 Central bank and endogenous money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2 Contemporary central banking 37
2.1 Monetary policy transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1.1 The symmetric corridor approach . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.2 Exceptional measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2.1 Liquidity trap or balance sheet recession? . . . . . . . . 49
3 The ECB and the crisis 55
3
4 CONTENTS
3.1 The Eurosystem from 2007 to 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.1.1 The calm before the storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.1.2 Clouds approaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.1.3 Storm unleashed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.1.4 Uneasy calm settles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.2 Wind of change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2.1 Quantitative Easing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4 Not all that glitters is gold 79
4.1 Inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.2 GDP and investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3 Bond yields, bank lending and exchange rate . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.4 Stock prices, dividends and inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Conclusions 101
Bibliography 107
List of Figures
1.1 Endogenous money supply and money demand. Source: Lavoie,
1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.2 Money creation by the aggregate banking sector making addi-
tional loans. Source: McLeay, 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.1 The transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Source: The
Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2 Symmetric corridor approach. Source: Keister et al., 2008 . . 41
2.3 Tracking ECB’s policy cycle. Source: Bibow, 2016. . . . . . . 46
2.4 The transmission mechanism under Asset Purchasing Pro-
grammes Source: Hauskenand and Ncube, 2013 . . . . . . . . 47
2.5 The liquidity trap Source: Carlin and Soskice, 2006 . . . . . . 50
2.6 Euro area leverage by sector, year-on-year changes in leverage
ratio. Source: Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013 . . . . . . . . 53
5
6 LIST OF FIGURES
3.1 Eurosystem total assets. Source: Borio and Zabai, 2016 3)
Securities of euro area residents and general government debt, in euros.
4) Lending to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy
operations, in euros. 5) Including US dollar liquidity auctions. For the
euro system this includes all foreign currency claims to both residents
and non-residents of the euro area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 Eurosystem total liabilities. Source: Borio and Zabai, 2016
3) Banknotes in circulation. 4) Current accounts, covering the minimum
reserve system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 TARGET 2 balances of selected, billions of euro. Source:
Bruegel Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4 TARGET2 balances versus overall liquidity provision and ab-
sorption and excess liquidity, billions of euro. Source: Cour-
Thimann, 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.5 Eurosystem monetary policy operations, billions of euro. Source:
ECB, 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.6 Allocation of monthly asset purchases by the Eurosystem.
Source: Claeys et al., 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.7 Evolution of Eurosystem sovereign holdings for Greece. Source:
Claeys et al., 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.8 Evolution of Eurosystem sovereign holdings for Germany. Source:
Claeys et al., 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.9 Monthly purchases under the three asset purchase programmes
of the ECB, ebillions. Source: Demertzis and Wolff, 2016 . . 78
4.1 Euro area inflation. Source: ECB, author’s computations. . . 81
4.2 Contributions to real GDP growth, percentage points. Source:
Demertzis and Wolff, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
LIST OF FIGURES 7
4.3 Selected Euro-area countries’ gross fixed capital formation,
percentage of GDP, current prices. Source: Eurostat, author’s
computation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4 TARGET2 and balance of payment, Italy. Monthly data, bil-
lions of euro. Source: Economic bulletin, July 2016, Bank of
Italy. Author’s translation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5 Ten-year government bond spreads against Germany, percent-
age points. Source: Demertzis and Wolff, 2016 Notes: 1) What-
ever it takes 2) Announcement and start of PSPP 3) CSPP and expansion
of PSPP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.6 Euro area lending, billion of euro. Source: ECB, author’s
computation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.7 Euro area lending decisions. Source: ECB (2016b) . . . . . . . 89
4.8 USD/EUR exchange rate and Euro area current account bal-
ance, quarterly change. Source: ECB, author’s computation. . 91
4.9 Euro area Stoxx Price Index and U.S. S&P 500, quarterly
change. Source: ECB, author’s computation. . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.10 Euro area net issued shares, quarterly data, millions of euro.
Source: ECB, author’s computation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.11 Italian net issued shares, billions of euro. Source: CONSOB,
2016. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.12 Total retained earnings and accumulated dividends of a group
of 90 euro area banks, billions of euros. Source: Shin, 2016. . . 96
4.13 Bank capital and loan growth. Source: Gambacorta and Shin,
2016. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8 LIST OF FIGURES
4.14 Stocks and housing drive the asset return differential, percent-
age points. Source: Domanski et al., 2016. . . . . . . . . . . . 98
List of Tables
1.1 Central Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.2 Bank Alpha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3 Bank Alpha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4 Bank Beta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5 Bank Beta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6 Bank Beta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.7 Bank Gamma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.8 Central Bank’s balance sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.9 Banking sector’s balance sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.1 Banking sector’s balance sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2 Central Bank’s balance sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3 Eurosystem, 29 June 2007 (in billion euro). Source: Mercier, 2014. . . . 44
2.4 Interbank Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Central Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
9
10 LIST OF TABLES
3.1 Eurosystem, 30 September 2011 (in billion euro). Source: Mercier, 2014 . 62
3.2 Eurosystem, 2 March 2012 (in billion euro). Source: Mercier, 2014 . . . 64
3.3 Eurosystem, 13 July 2012 (in billion euro). Source: Mercier, 2014 . . . . 66
3.4 Eurosystem, 18 October 2013 (in billion euro). Source: Mercier, 2014 . . 68
Introduction
The master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts.
He must be mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher —
in some degree. He must understand symbols and speak in words.
He must contemplate the particular in terms of the general, and
touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of thought. He
must study the present in the light of the past for the purposes of
the future. No part of man’s nature or his institutions must lie
entirely outside his regard. He must be purposeful and
disinterested in a simultaneous mood; as aloof and incorruptible
as an artist, yet sometimes as near the earth as a politician.
J. M. Keynes, “Alfred Marshall, 1842-1924”, The Economic
Journal (September 1924)
Nine years after the explosion of the most severe financial crisis
since the Great Depression, most Euro area countries are still struggling
with historically-low levels of GDP growth. Given the legal constraints on
fiscal policies imposed by the Maastricht Treaty, the burden of restoring GDP
growth and employment has been shifted from national governments to the
European Central Bank (ECB). The European monetary authorities at first
depressed the target rate, thus implementing the usual interest rate policy.
Once the zero lower bound was attained, the ECB decided to purchase gov-
ernment securities and private bonds on the secondary market. This decision
marked the abandonment of conventional central banking and represented
the first step towards the adoption of unconventional balance sheet policies.
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The effects of these measures on key economic variables such as investment,
inflation and employment is what this dissertation will assess. Post-keynesian
economics will provide the main theoretical reference to better understand
how central banks operate in a modern credit-based capitalist economy and
how the economic environment is supposed to react. The mainstream view
will be challenged by arguing that unconventional monetary policies such
as the Quantitative Easing have no significant impact on aggregate demand
and on other macroeconomic variables. It will be showed that asset purchas-
ing programmes lead to perverse outcomes consisting in increasing financial
instability via the substitution of safe with risky assets. Lastly, this encour-
ages corporations in exploiting carry trade opportunities and accelerate the
already worrisome dominance of the financial sector.
Chapter 1 will provide a critique to one of the most important
monetary relationships in economics, the quantity theory of money. The
existence of a money multiplier regulating bank credit will be dismissed by
arguing that the causality between loans and deposits runs from the former to
the latter. Although important, bank reserves provided by the central bank
have a different role than that one postulated by neoclassical economics.
Chapter 2 contains an explanation on how contemporary central
banking is conducted. The main mechanisms for implementing both con-
ventional and unconventional monetary policies are assessed. A comparison
between the liquidity trap theory and the balance sheet recession hypothesis
is presented in order to better explain the nature of the great financial crisis,
why central banks decided to rely on balance sheet policies and why these
could even fail.
Chapter 3 summarises the ECB role since the beginning of the fi-
nancial crisis in August 2007. The focus will be on the Eurosystem balance
sheet covering different years, which will illustrate how liquidity and credit
management have evolved. Details about asset purchase programmes and
how such measures should affect the liquidity transmission mechanism will
be scrutinised.
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Finally, chapter 4 will analyse key economic indicators such as in-
flation, GDP growth, investment and bank lending in order to better under-
stand the efficacy of unconventional monetary policies. Was the ECB acting
as a lender of last resort, or was it just adding ’another brick in the wall’?
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Chapter 1
Of money, liquidity and
inflation
The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in
escaping from old ones.
J. M. Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money” (1936: Preface)
Economics deals with money and monetary aggregates, yet the
question ‘what is money?’ is not an easy one to answer. A common defi-
nition is that one depicting money both as a medium of exchange and as a
mean through which wealth can be stored. But sill one has to attach some
sort of material characteristics to this idea. What usually come first into
someone’s mind trying to imagine which forms money can take is either gold
or banknotes. These are very different items, and in fact the first reminds of
the ancient age when the monetary system of countries like United States,
France, Italy and - most notably - Great Britain was based on the Gold
Standard. Nowadays gold is mainly a commodity exchanged on financial
markets, and indeed it serves as a shield against inflation or during bearish
times. Banknotes are instead used as a payment instrument. Their value
15
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relies on the trust that the public has on the institution releasing cash - the
mint. This is why this particular form of money is referred to as fiat money,
at least since the end of convertibility. There is also another form of money
which is bank deposits, usually identified as the monetary resources which
can be lend out by commercial banks to customers requesting a loan. De-
posits play a crucial role in the contemporary age, as most of the people have
a bank account nowadays. They also figure in the definition of M2, which is
the sum of M1 and short-term time deposits in bank, being M1 the sum of
coins and notes in circulation plus demand deposits. M3 - also called broad
money - refers instead to the sum of banknotes and all kind of deposits, while
M0 - the monetary base - is made up solely by notes and coins in circulation
plus banks’ reserves.1
Even if the history of money is a fascinating subject, the focus of this chapter
will be on the interaction between monetary and real variables. The predom-
inant theory which stands back to the majority of macroeconomic models is
the Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) which relates the money supply to
inflation and nominal output. This chapter will provide an explanation of
this theory and a survey of the critical attacks that have been striken against
it, mainly by Post-keynesian and Neo-ricardian economists. The main goal
is to better understand what money creation is, how private banks deal with
it and what is the role of the central bank.
1.1 The Quantity Theory of Money
Most of the theoretical and empirical explanations of the effects of monetary
variables on inflation and income rely upon the Quantity Theory of Money,
which is dated back to David Hume’s text On Money. This theoretical frame-
work was then embraced by Alfred Marshall and Arthur Cecil Pigou, who
derived the Cambridge cash-balance approach. According to the latter, the
demand for money is equal to a fraction, k, of the annual value of money
1These are the definitions provided by the European Central Bank. They can vary
depending on the country to which are referred or the institution that releases them.
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national income, PY , that firms and households wish to hold (Snowdon and
Vane, 2005). The simple mathematics behind this holds that:
Md = kPY
There are three hypotheses behind this equation. The first is that
k is stable over the long run but it may vary in the short run. The second
is that national real income, Y , is at its full employment level. The third
hypothesis postulates that prices, P , are flexible. Moreover, the supply of
money, M s, is assumed to be exogenous and under the control of the Central
Bank. In equilibrium, supply and demand are equal thus:
M s = kPY
Since k and Y are assumed to be fixed at their long-run level, any
change in the money supply, M s, will be reflected by a corresponding shift
in the general level of prices, P . This is equivalent of saying that money de-
termines prices, which implies a causal relationship running from the former
to the latter. For example, if the money supply is greater than the money
demand, household and firms find themselves holding more money than they
desire, so they will purchase goods and services with excess money balances.
This will lead to excess demand in the goods market that will cause prices
to increase, as the national income is considered at its long-run full employ-
ment level. Moreover, the change in prices will be proportional to the excess
money supply with respect to money demand.
The QTM can be restated as the Fisher equation, which is the
following:
MV = PY
This equation, also called the income version of the QTM, is just
an algebrical manipulation of the previous one. V is the reciprocal of the
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Cambridge multiplier, k, and it measures the income velocity of circulation
of money. The same assumptions of the previous formulation hold for the in-
come version and the result is again that prices are positively correlated with
the amount of money in circulation, as can be easily verified by rearranging
the terms in the following order:
P =
MV
Y
A monetary expansion can now be examined under the light of the
so-called Fisher effect, which postulates that an increase in the nominal rate
of interest will raise the general price level, so to maintain the real interest
rate at its equilibrium level.2 The explanation is that the real interest rate
is determined by the real forces of productivity and thrift, and it is not
affected by nominal variables such as inflation and nominal interest rate.
The conclusion is again that money is neutral. As Milton Friedman famously
wrote:
Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in
the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid
increase in the quantity of money than in output3 (Friedman,
1963).
However, well before him John Maynard Keynes wrote something
similar when explaining the role of the interest rate. The British economist
claimed that liquidity preference, in conjunction with the supply of money
2According to the marginalist theory, the real interest rate adjusts to equate savings
and investment through the loanable funds market. Keynes referred to this postulate as
the classical model of the interest rate’s determination.
3This is true provided that the assumption about the stability of the demand for money
- i.e. the velocity of money, as measured by the ratio between M3 and Y - is constant over
time. Friedman conducted several econometric testings on US time series data on money
and income in order to prove that changes in M always preceded changes in Y by a time
lag ranging from 6 months to 2 years. However, Kaldor fiercely and succesfully criticised
these findings (Kaldor, 1982).
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set by monetary authorities, determined the level of the rate of interest.
Thus, the latter is a purely monetary phenomenon because it is the reward
for parting with liquidity and not the reward for abstinence from consump-
tion. According to liquidity preference theory, there are three motives for
holding money: transaction, speculative and precautionary. The first arises
from the need of having some liquidity for buying goods and services. The
second arises from considering the rate of return that could be earned on
financial markets by buying private bonds or Government securities. The
third is related to uncertainty, against which the public would like to hoard
some money when assets prices are falling. In this case, the interest rate
not only depends on the money supply, but also on confidence. Contrary
to what the marginalists thought, and to what later on Friedman believed,
liquidity preference can vary in such a way that the demand for money is not
a stable function. As a result, the velocity of circulation can change as well.4
It then becomes plausible that monetary variables can influence output and
employment. Money is not neutral anymore, as an increase in the money
supply would bring down the nominal interest rate, stimulating investment
by the marginal efficiency of capital, defined as the rate of discount which
would make ‘the present value of the series of annuities given by the returns
expected from the capital asset during its life just equal its supply price’
(Keynes, 1936). Being the main component of aggregate demand, invest-
ment would stimulate output and employment. This conclusion is based on
the dismissal of Say’s law operated by the British economist. The General
Theory is in fact centred on the idea that market economies may well be
affected by involuntary unemployment which prevented output to attain its
potential.
Keynes attacked the QTM but retained one of its main assump-
tions: the money supply is under the control of the central bank. This same
assumption is maintained by Friedman when reviving the QTM as a theory
of the demand for money, which for him is a function of permanent income,
Y P , return on financial assets, r, expected inflation, P e, and individuals’
4Institutions and historical events affect this variable too.
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preferences as represented by the utility function u:
Md
P
= f(Y P , r, P e, u)
Real money balances will be allocated between assets such that the
marginal rates of return are equal. The equilibrium is reached by mean of
portfolio adjustments, which can be induced through open market operations
implemented by monetary authorities. For instance, when the central bank
purchases bonds, money holdings will increase as a result of the diminished
rate of return on financial assets. Excess money balances are exchanged for
those real and financial assets experiencing increasing prices until all of them
will offer the same marginal rate of return. According to this view, and con-
trary to what orthodox keynesianism explains, money is just a substitute for
a wide range of real and financial assets (Snowdon, 2005)
The theory elaborated by Milton Friedman gained the name of mon-
etarism, but in reality it was just a re-statement of the QTM nested in a
walrasian economy in which the scarcity of money determines its own price.
This commodity money theory is, again, nothing new at all, as it resembles
what the Currency School prescribed for curbing excessive inflation: the de-
struction of banknotes. The main peculiarity is that Friedman’s theory is
nested into a Walrasian framework which borrows from Knut Wicksell the
notion of natural rate of interest, i.e. the rate at which the demand for loan
capital and the supply of savings exactly agree (Wicksell, 1898). If banks
fail to adjust lending rates to the natural rate of interest, the price level will
vary. Starting from a situation of full employment equilibrium, a positive
supply-side shock would lead to higher consumption and investment, thus
resulting in an increased aggregate money expenditure. If the rate of interest
on loans is kept constant, prices will increase until commercial banks will
find profitable to raise the market interest rate. Only when the latter will
be equal to the natural rate of interest, inflation will stop (Garegnani, 1979;
Wicksell, 1898; Rogers, 1989). The wicksellian concept is transformed by
the Chicago’s economist into the notion of the natural rate of unemployment
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defined as
the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system
of general equilibrium equations, provided there is embedded
in them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and
commodity markets, including market imperfections (Friedman,
1968).
The natural rate of unemployment reflects institutional variables such as the
strength of labour unions. It can be changed by operating on such real forces
of the economy, but it will be attained by adopting the interest rate to the
natural rate of interest. This is precisely the task that monetarist economists
attribute to monetary authorities.
1.2 Banks and the money supply process
The QTM is closely linked with the issue of credit creation. The standard
textbook explanation of how banks provide credit to their customers involves
the notion of the credit or money multiplier. Under a fractional-reserve bank-
ing system, banks have to hold a fraction of their deposits as deposits at the
central bank, while they can lend out the remainder through the creation of
deposits arising from loans being granted to customers. Reserve requirements
are regulated by law, while the public has a certain degree of stable preference
for holding cash that can be measured by means of the rate of M3 to central
bank reserves. This ratio is precisely the money multiplier. It tells how much
deposits increase when the central bank supplies the banking system with a
certain amount of additional reserves. When the central bank expands the
money supply via open market operations, it acquires government securities
(i.e. assets increase) so to expand reserves held by private banks. The central
bank’s liabilities increase, while the banking system’s assets (reserves) and
liabilities (deposits) increase. Additional reserves, i.e. the amount of reserves
that are in excess with respect to those that private banks have to park in the
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central bank, allow banks to make loans by creating deposits (Mishkin et al.,
2013). Thus, what is being lend out is not excess reserves per se. Commer-
cial banks supply credit to the economy only when they have a corresponding
amount of reserves. Nonetheless, the standard textbook explanation of the
money supply process assumes that the central bank can control the exact
amount of credit and that excess reserves are required by commercial banks
before they can lend out money via loans. Moreover, the amount of reserves
issued by the central bank has to be consistent with the quantity of loans
provided by commercial banks when the market interest rate is equal to the
natural interest rate. Only if this condition holds, bank deposits will match
with full-employment savings.
The set of operations conducive to an expansion of the money supply
can be easily described by means of T-accounts, as in the following example.
The starting point is the creation of reserves via open market operations
implemented by the central bank, which for example can buy government
securities from private banks. The outcome is an increase in central bank’s
assets. According to the basic accounting principle by which the two columns
have to be equal, liabilities have also to increase. Hence, reserves increase as
well.
Assets Liabilities
Securities 100 Reserves 100
Table 1.1: Central Bank
Bank Alpha sold securities worth e100 and increased reserves by
the same amount. Thus, the amount of excess reserves is now e100.
Assets Liabilities
Securities -100
Reserves +100
Table 1.2: Bank Alpha
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If the bank does not want to hold excess reserves, it may decide to
create a loan equal in amount to the e100 increase in excess reserves.
Assets Liabilities
Reserves 100 Deposits 100
Loans 100
Table 1.3: Bank Alpha
Bank Alpha extends the loan to Bank Beta, which initially has no
excess reserves.
Assets Liabilities
Reserves 100 Deposits 100
Table 1.4: Bank Beta
If the required reserve ratio is 10 per cent, Bank Beta will find itself
with excess reserves equal to e90 and an increase in required reserves of
e10. Therefore, Bank Beta can lend its excess reserves to households, firms
or other banks.
Assets Liabilities
Reserves 10 Deposits 100
Loans 90
Table 1.5: Bank Beta
Let us suppose that Bank Beta decides to lend out its excess reserves
to Bank Gamma. This is an example of a simple operation conducted among
commercial banks on the interbank market, in which reserves are exchanged
at the prevalent interbank rate of interest.5
5In the Euro area, there are many interbank rates called Euro Interbank Offered Rate
(Euribor). The Euribor rates are based on the interest rates at which a panel of European
banks borrow funds from one another. The Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA) is
the 1-day interbank interest rate for the Euro zone and can be considered as the 1 day
Euribor rate.
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Assets Liabilities
Reserves 90 Deposits 90
Table 1.6: Bank Beta
Bank Gamma will keep 10 per cent of e90 (e9) and will lend out
the remainder (e81) via making loans.
Assets Liabilities
Reserves 9 Deposits 90
Loans 81
Table 1.7: Bank Gamma
From the initial e100 increase of reserves in the banking system,
the total increase in deposits in the banking system has been e271. Iterating
this procedure, it follows that if all banks make loans for the full amount of
their excess reserves, the total increase in deposits would equal the reciprocal
of the reserve ratio (e1000 in the example).6 Mishkin et al. (2013) conclude
that
A single bank cannot make loans greater in amount than its re-
serves, because the bank will lose these reserves as the deposits
created by the loan find their way to other banks. However, the
banking system as a whole can generate a multiple expansion of
deposits, because when a bank loses its reserves, these reserves
do not leave the banking system even though they are lost to the
individual bank (Mishkin et al., 2013).
The authors also recognise that the money multiplier is the maximum amount
of credit that can be generated by an increase in reserves. If proceeds from
Bank Beta’s e90 loan are not deposited but are kept in currency, nothing is
6In the example, banks invested excess reserves in loans creation. Had they chosen to
buy securities, the deposit expansion process would have not changed.
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deposited in Bank Gamma and the deposit creation process ceases. In gen-
eral, this happens when banks do not make loans or buy securities in the full
amount of their excess reserves. Depositors’ decisions regarding how much
currency to hold and banks’ preference about the amount of excess reserves to
hold should be taken into account for deriving a more precise formula for the
money multiplier. The conclusion is that a 1% change in the high powered
money is not necessarily translated into a 1% change in currency even if the
mechanism of multiple expansion of deposits is still functioning. This is the
same to acknowledge the fact that the central bank’s ability to control the
money supply may be limited, especially when the money multiplier is influ-
enced by factors that decreases its magnitude.7 However, in the long run the
behaviour of banks and depositors is assumed to be stable and predictable.
Hence, a close link between the monetary base and the quantity of money
supply exists. This implies that the central bank have the ability to control
the money supply via changes in high powered money, M0. Accordingly,
open market operations are conducted not to influence the cost of borrowing
funds from banks, but to directly affect the money supply (Friedman, 1968).
This operating principle is part of the reserve position doctrine (RPD) and
contrasts the view put forward by the short-term interest rate doctrine (SID)
by which the central bank sets the short-term (interbank) interest rate by
standing ready to meet the banking system’s demand of reserves (Bindseil,
2004).
7Banking crisis and financial turmoil are among those factors that make the money
multiplier more volatile
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1.3 Critiques to the Quantity Theory of Money
One of the central tenets of the Post-keynesian school of thought8 is the en-
dogeneity of money, according to which the causality running from deposits
to loans is inverted: it is loans that creates deposits, and not the other way
around (Lavoie, 1984; Robinson, 1970). Private banks do not need excess
reserves before lending out money to households or firms. In a monetary
production economy such as that one in which we are living since the end of
the 19th century, money is created only if someone goes into debt in order
to purchase goods and services. As such, money is part of the production
process and it is not injected into the system by the central bank or by
helicopters throwing cash to people. While adherents to the QTM like mon-
etarist economists thought money as a commodity or a stock, Post-keynesians
regard money as a flow, that is to say they study it as credit-money. The
confusion between stocks and flows may arise from the fact that the QTM
treats money as a particular commodity which can represented by gold, the
scarcity of which determines its price. But even during the Gold Standard
age, paper money existed. There has never been a one to one correspondence
with the number of banknotes and the amount of gold stored in the central
bank’s vault, so that money in circulation was a multiple of gold reserves.
This became even clearer when bank deposits became a further circulating
medium (Kaldor, 1982).
The endogeneity of money is neither a very innovative idea nor a
concept useful to distinguish mainstream from heterodox economics.9 Knut
8Post-keynesian economists are those who carry on the tradition initiated by the writ-
ings of John Maynard Keynes. They reject both the hydraulic keynesianism promoted by
James Tobin and Paul Samuelson. Post-keynesians can be distinguished in the American
community (Jan Kregel, Alfred Eichner, Paul Davidson and Hyman Minsky, etc.) and
the British group (Nicholas Kaldor, Richard Kahn, Joan Robinson, etc.). They also differ
completely from the methodology and the research scope adopted by neo-keynesians such
as Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman.
9The monetarist school borrowed from Wicksell the concept of the natural rate of
interest, which is crucial for deriving the conditions under which the rate of inflation is
non-accelerating. Hyman Minsky, one of Schumpeter’s pupils, might have developed his
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Wicksell, one of the leading economists who belonged to the Austrian School,
is often cited as the pioneer of endogenous money. The fact that banks could
accomodate demand for loans without changing the interest rate was the
main cause of inflation, that arise exactly when the market interest rate is
different from the natural interest rate. The latter is determined by real
variables such as quantities of factors, technical knowledge and consumers’
preferences. Thus, the natural rate of interest changes when these variables
evolve and it is not influenced by monetary fluctuations. It can also be de-
fined as the interest of capital lent in kind without the intervention of money,
thus arising either from a one commodity model or from a multiple commod-
ity world in which capital goods are homogeneous. In fact, Wicksell thought
of capital as it was composed of saved-up labour and land (Garegnani, 1978;
Rogers, 1989).
In the General Theory, Keynes realised that effective demand for
commodities in the aggregate is determined by autonomous demand financed
by loan expenditures and not by monetary factors. The fact that loans do
not need deposits implies that saving is different from financing, as it is
possible to borrow just by relying on the expected future profitability of in-
vestment. The main implication is that investment and savings are bought
into equality ex post through the adjustment of incomes and not through
changes in the nominal rate of interest (Keynes, 1936; Lavoie, 1984; Kaldor,
1982). This stands in sharp contrast with the marginalist conception of an
investment demand function elastic with respect to the nominal interest rate.
According to neoclassical economists, capital goods are boiled down into a
homogeneous commodity called capital. This particular factor of production
has a negative elasticity with respect to its own price, determined by the
interaction between supply and demand (Garegnani, 1978). Instead, Keynes
view on the banking and the financial system by referring to his master’s intuitions. In
fact, Minsky argued that anybody can create money - the problem is to get it accepted
(Papadimitriou, 2010). Augusto Graziani, the prominent Italian economist regarded as
the inventor of the monetary circuit, was a proponent of endogenous money, too. On the
contrary, Charles Goodhart regards himself as a mainstream economist but nonetheless
he never supported the idea of an exogenous money supply.
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thought of investment projects as ranked in order of decreasing profitability,
so that entrepreneurs will carry out those investments up to the point at
which the marginal efficiency of capital is greater or equal than the rate of
interest. However, this is not the same of elaborating a theory based on the
decreasing marginal productivity of capital, because the last project to be
implemented may well be the least capital intensive of all (Pasinetti, 1974).
Its realisation will entail a decrease of capital intensity, thus a decrease in
aggregate investment, which is defined as the demand for capital goods. This
also means that it is possible to find more than one level of interest rate such
that savings are equal to investment. In this case, labelled as reswitching
during the Cambridge Controversy, even if the natural rate of interest could
be defined, the stability of the equilibrium may not be granted. (Rogers,
1989). The wicksellian theory is thus subject to the problem of circular rea-
soning i.e. the impossibility of defining the value of capital without knowing
the interest rate first, for which the value of capital must be available. In a
more than one commodity world, this problem is solved by expressing capital
in value terms, but this implies assuming that capital goods are homogeneous
so they can move between sectors to equalise the rate of interest. Nonethe-
less, the natural rate of interest is not consistent from a theoretical and a
logical point of view.
1.3.1 The banking sector reconsidered
The banking sector does not serve the meagre role of an intermediary be-
tween surplus units (those having excess savings) and deficit agents (those
consuming or investing more than they can afford). Instead, banks are the
fulcrum of the economic activity as they provide credit to investment that
are expected to generate a future cash inflow whose discounted present value
equals or exceeds the money cash outflow currently needed to purchase the
asset. This means that loans are approved as long as there are creditwor-
thy entrepreneurs or households who ask for credit (Lavoie, 2014; Snowdon,
2005). Therefore, endogenous money does not mean illimited credit. It rather
states that the quantity equation must be read thinking about MV as the
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dependent variable and PY as the independent one, so that causality goes
from right to left (Robinson, 1970). A useful graphical representation is a
horizontal money-supply curve which implies that the rate of interest (i.e.
the cost of credit) is set exogenously by the banking sector, which provides
monetary units to creditworthy entrepreneurs (Lavoie, 1984; Kaldor, 1982).
Figure 1.1: Endogenous money supply and money demand. Source: Lavoie,
1984
The view by which loans are created ‘out of thin air’ is nothing
really new. Apart from the debate confined within the walls of the academia,
there are historical documents showing that the quantity theory of money
is a misconception of the functioning of the monetary system. One of such
documents was the report elaborated by the Committee on the Working of
the Monetary System in 1959 (Kaldor, 1982). Under the leadership of Lord
Radcliffe, the Committee studied the British financial and monetary system
in order to understand whether monetary policy could be regarded as a more
flexible and reliable instrument of economic control than fiscal policy. The
conclusion was a denial of the QTM and of monetarism claims altogether:
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The spending is not limited by the amount of money in existence
but it is related to the amount of money people think they can get
hold of. [...] The fact that spending is not limited by the money
in existence is sometimes argued by reference to the velocity of
circulation of money. [...] We have not made more use of this
concept because we cannot find any reason for supposing, or any
experience in monetary history indicating, that there is any limit
to the velocity of circulation; it is a statistical concept that tells
us nothing directly of the motivation that influences the level of
total demand. [...] ‘The supply of money’ - whatever that may
be made to mean - is not by itself a reliable policy measure, and
the authorities must seek rather to influence the general liquidity
situation by operating on rates of interest. Given this approach
regulation of the banks is required not because they are ‘creators
of money’ but because they are the biggest lenders at the shortes
(most liquid) end of the range of credit markets (Kaldor, 1982).
Today, many financial institutions and monetary authorities recog-
nise the validity of endogenous money. The Bank of England has been one
of the first central banks to publish an account on how money is created
(McLeay, 2014). From the first page of the paper, one can read that:
Banks do not act simply as intermediaries, lending out deposits
that savers place with them, and nor do they ‘multiply up’ central
bank money to create new loans and deposits. [...] Whenever a
bank makes a loan, it simultaneously creates a matching deposit
in the borrower’s bank account, thereby creating new money. [...]
Rather than banks receiving deposits when households save and
then lending them out, bank lending creates deposits.[...] Al-
though commercial banks create money through lending, they
cannot do so freely without limit. Banks are limited in how
much they can lend if they are to remain profitable in a com-
petitive banking system. Prudential regulation also acts as a
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constraint on banks’ activities in order to maintain the resilience
of the financial system (McLeay, 2014).
Figure 1.2: Money creation by the aggregate banking sector making addi-
tional loans. Source: McLeay, 2014
Another institution that released documents explaining its view
about the functioning of the banking sector is the US-based rating agency
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Standard & Poor’s. A paper which title is Repeat after me: banks cannot and
do not “lend out” reserves is self-explaining but some quotes are necessary
to fully understand what the message is:
Neither individual banks nor banks as a whole can “lend out”
reserves, but individual banks can and do oﬄoad their reserves
(particularly excess reserves) by lending them to other banks or
by buying assets; but the banks in aggregate cannot do this–in
such cases, the reserves that leave one bank’s balance sheet just
pop up on another, remaining on the central bank’s balance sheet
all the while. [...] Banks lend by simultaneously creating a loan
asset and a deposit liability on their balance sheet. That is why
it is called credit “creation”–credit is created literally out of thin
air (or with the stroke of a keyboard). The loan is not created
out of reserves. And the loan is not created out of deposits: loans
create deposits, not the other way around (Sheard, 2013).
Money creation faces some limits, so that even if loans can be
granted to households and firms, the amount may be constrained by sev-
eral factors, including:
• The price of loans, which is make up by the interest rate plus any fees.
The difference between the rate that borrowers pay on loans and the
interest rate that the bank pays out on its deposits is the spread. This
has to be positive so that banks remain profitable.
• The demand for loans, which not only depends on the interest rate paid
by borrowers but also on their investment plans - that is, expectations
or animal spirits (Keynes, 1936).
• Expected profitability, which depends on the internal rate of return of
the investment which is going to be financed by the bank through the
loan.
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• Risk mitigation, which can be pursued by attracting stable deposits
to match new loans. In fact, banking business consists in managing
assets and liabilities with different maturities in such a way to avoid
liquidity issues. The other risk to be minimised is credit risk. Usually,
this is done by lending to borrowers judged to be able to repay their
debt. If this is not the case, the loss will be absorbed by bank’s capital,
provided this is enough.
• Regulatory policy. The central bank can restrict the quantity of lending
or its direction - e.g. the Glass-Steagall Act enforced a distinction
between commercial and investment banks.
• Monetary policy, which ultimate aim is to set the short-term interest
rate paid on central bank reserves held by commercial banks. This is
a cost that the banking sector has to cover by demanding an adequate
interest rate on loans.
1.4 Central bank and endogenous money
If private banks do not need excess reserves for extending credit to the econ-
omy, which is the role of the central bank?
In normal times, the central bank does not fix the amount of
money in circulation, nor is central bank money ‘multiplied up’
into more loans and deposits. [...] Another common misconcep-
tion is that the central bank determines the quantity of loans
and deposits in the economy by controlling the quantity of cen-
tral bank money — the so-called ‘money multiplier’ approach
(McLeay, 2014).
Instead of fixing the amount of reserves available to the banking
sector, the central bank fixes the interest rate by accommodating the demand
for reserves arising from private banks’ needs such as withdrawals by the
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public or payments to other commercial banks. When a bank lend out money,
it simultaneously creates a loan asset and a deposit liability on its balance
sheet. The deposits need a certain amount of reserves to be held against
them. The role of the central bank is precisely to supply those reserves
(Sheard, 2013). This can be seen from the stylised version of the central
bank’s T-account, which is:
Assets Liabilities
Securities S Reserves R
Banknotes BK
Government Deposits GD
Table 1.8: Central Bank’s balance sheet
The corresponding balance sheet identity is the following:
Securities (S) = Reserves (R) + Banknotes in Circulation (BK) +
Government Deposits (GD)
In change terms, this becomes:
∆S = ∆R + ∆BK + ∆GD
Rearranging:
∆R = ∆S −∆BK −∆GD
Reserves are a liability of the central bank and their aggregate level
can change in three ways:
1. Assets increase (decrease)
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2. The amount of cash the public wants to hold increase (decrease)
3. Government deposits increase (decreases)
Instead, the banking system’s balance sheet can be represented by
mean of the following balance sheet:
Assets Liabilities
Reserves R Deposits D
Loans L Equity E
Securities S
Table 1.9: Banking sector’s balance sheet
The accounting identity can be written as:
Reserves (R) + Loans (L) + Securities (S) = Deposits (D) + Equity (E)
In change terms:
∆R + ∆L+ ∆S = ∆D + ∆E
Bank lending implies that the change in loans must be equal to the
change in deposits, thus:
∆D = ∆L⇔ ∆R = ∆L = ∆S = 0
If instead ∆S = ∆B = ∆E = 0, the bank can still decide to make
a new loan, but then it will have to borrow reserves either from other banks
or directly from the central bank. The change in loans must be equal to the
change in reserves - ∆L = −∆R - but this doesn’t mean that reserves are
actually what is being lend out. Reserves are a liability for the central bank,
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so that if they have to shrink, assets are reduced or banknotes or government
deposits increase. In fact, when the loan is granted, the borrower will either
deposit the money in the banking system or he/she will withdraw cash.10
When deposits are converted into cash, reserves goes down (provided that
assets and government deposits do not change):
∆R = −∆BK ⇔ ∆A = ∆GD = 0
For banks as a whole, new lending leads to a reduction in reserves
only to the extent that the deposits created move into cash in circulation
(Sheard, 2013). The other way by which deposits can pop up is when the
government runs budget deficits, as this just means that current expendi-
ture is greater than tax revenues. The counterpart of this operations is the
increase in the central bank’s reserves:
∆D = ∆R⇔ ∆L = ∆S = ∆E = 0
∆R = −∆GD ⇔ ∆A = ∆BK = 0
10When the loan is spent to repay outstanding debt, money is destroyed. This is the
reflux principle highlighted by Kaldor and Trevithick (1981)
Chapter 2
Contemporary central banking
After a few days, the inn-keeper decided that the wealthy Jew was
not going to return. So he took the $100 note and used it to clear
his debt with the local butcher. The butcher was delighted and
gave the note for safe-keeping to his wife. She used it to clear
her debts with a local seamstress who made up dresses for her.
The seamstress was delighted, and took the money to repay her
rent arrears with her landlord. The landlord was pleased to get
his rent arrears with her landlord. The landlord was pleased to
get his rent at last and gave the money to pay his mistress, who
had been giving him her favours without any return for far too
long. The mistress was pleased because she could now use the
note to clear off her debt at the local inn where she occasionally
rented rooms.
Jan Toporowski, “A Kalecki fable on debt and the monetary
transmission mechanism” (August 2015)
Academic papers usually refer to the central bank as the institution
controlling the short-term interest rate, but not so much is said on how this
economic variable is actually influenced. Economists also miss the purpose
of the monetary weapons that the central banker can draw from his arsenal,
37
38 CHAPTER 2. CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL BANKING
which ranges from the standard open market operation to different kind of
lending operations and facilities. This chapter will provide an assessment of
the various tools that the modern central banker can use to implement mon-
etary policy. Where examples will be required to better explain a particular
operation, reference to the European Central Bank (the ECB from now on)
will be made.
2.1 Monetary policy transmission
There is consensus that the main tool which central banks can directly in-
fluence is the short-term interbank interest rate, that is the interest rate
on central bank money being exchanged on the inter-bank markets. This
variable is then the operational target of monetary policy, and according to
Bindseil (2014) it has to have the following characteristics:
• It can be controlled by the central bank
• It is economically relevant
• It is set by the policy decision-making body of the central bank1
• It gives the necessary and sufficient guidance to the monetary policy
implementation officers on what to do on a day-by-day basis in the
inter-meeting period.
Once the operational target has been defined, the central bank can
choose which kind of monetary policy instrument to adopt in order to imple-
ment its ultimate objective - be it price stability, full employment or both -
via the transmission mechanism. That is, by steering the interest rate, the
1In the case of the ECB, this is the Governing Council which consists of the six members
of the Executive Board, plus the governors of the national central banks of the 19 euro area
countries. The Governing Council usually meets twice a month and takes its monetary
policy decisions every six weeks.
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central bank attempts to kill two birds with one stone: changes in the opera-
tional target will be transmitted to the entire matrix of interest rates across
the maturity structure of the various financial instrument. Then, the finan-
cial system will impact on decisions by households, corporates, government
and the rest of the world - what is commonly defined as the real economy.
Finally, all these actions will be reflected in those economic aggregates that
the central bank keeps under scrutiny. Not only the value, but also the way
in which the short-term interest rate is set affects the functioning of the open
market. To do so, the main system is the interest-rate corridor, by which the
target rate is achieved with the help of one or more central bank’s facilities.
The number of such facilities determines the specific corridor in use (Bindseil,
2014).
Figure 2.1: The transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Source: The
Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England
More precisely, the official rate affects the real economy via four
different channels. The first one is the impact on market rates, which can be
formalised by the yield curve. The short-term interest rate affects longer-term
interest rates such as mortgage rates and bank deposit rates, so that spending
decisions that need to be financed will be influenced. Ceteris paribus, higher
interest rates should encourage saving and discourage borrowing. However,
the impact on long-term interest rates is unclear. A rise in short-term interest
rates could generate an expectation of lower future interest rates, so that
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long-term interest rates fall instead of increase. The second channel is the
wealth effect that would be induced by increasing or decreasing asset prices.
Interest rates are inversely related to bond prices, which have an effect also
on other securities prices such as equities, as expected future returns are
discounted by a larger factor. Because of their use as collateral for mortgages
and as a major component of personal wealth, housing prices play a relevant
role in affecting spending decisions. Monetary policy has also distributional
effects: interest-rate rises make net borrowers worse off and net savers better
off. Thirdly, expectations can be influenced by the conduct of monetary
policy. An upward revision of the overnight rate may induce market operators
believing that the economy is likely to be growing faster than previously
thought or that inflation is expected to rise. Finally, the fourth economic
variable to be affected by a change in the official rate is the exchange rate.
According to the interest parity condition, an increase in the short-term
interest rate will induce an appreciation of the domestic currency relative
to foreign ones because of capital inflows. Some of these consequences will
affect the economy immediately, others will impact on aggregate demand
with some time lag (Bank of England).
2.1.1 The symmetric corridor approach
One way to set the short-term interest rate is via the symmetric corridor
approach. Under this framework, the central bank offers both a borrowing
and a deposit facility. The former is used by private banks that are short of
reserves, i.e. those banks that do not meet the reserve requirements set by
the central bank. Holders of eligible bills sell them to the central bank at a
price determined by discounting the nominal value of the asset at the dis-
count rate set by monetary authorities. The deposit facility allows financial
intermediaries to deposit their excess reserves in a particular bank account
managed by the central bank, which is remunerated at the deposit rate. The
borrowing and the deposit rate are set symmetrically around the target in-
terest rate. The central bank manages the amount of reserves through open
market operations (OMOs) - that is, purchases and sales of securities - in
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such a way that there is an equal probability that at the end of the reserve
maintenance period the banking system will need one or the other facility.
The resulting interbank interest rate is the target rate and coincides with
the mid point of the corridor in between the two facilities. Monetary policy
changes are carried out by moving the corridor in parallel, i.e. by acting on
the two facilities rate at the same time and in the same direction (Bindseil,
2014). Note that this does not necessarily require to conduct open market
operations. The ECB can control interest rate just by announcing its policy
decisions. In fact, signalling is one of the two core elements of monetary
policy implementation, the other being liquidity management operations.
Nonetheless, OMOs have an impact on interest rates (Disyatat, 2008). By
virtue of its monopoly over bank reserves, the central bank is able to set
the interbank rate simply because it stands ready to buy and sell unlimited
amounts at the chosen price (Borio and Disyatat, 2009; Fullwiler, 2008).
Figure 2.2: Symmetric corridor approach. Source: Keister et al., 2008
When the prevailing interbank overnight rate is greater than the
lending rate, private banks will ask for reserves via the borrowing facility.
On the other hand, if the interbank interest rate is less than the lending rate,
there will be a demand for reserves that the central bank has to accommodate.
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When the interbank rate is less than the deposit rate, there is an arbitrage
opportunity as banks can borrow at the market rate and then lend reserves
to the central bank to earn a higher interest rate. Uncertainty is one of
the main reasons to hold precautionary reserves in excess with respect to
reserve requirements. In principle, the less expensive is to hold excess reserve
balances, the greater the quantity demanded by the banking system will be.
This postulate is represented by the downward sloping demand curve for
reserves, which has also the following interpretation. Given that financial
markets are affected by uncertainty, it is possible to model the recourse to
standing facility with a stochastic variable d with E(d) = 0 and a symmetric
density function. In the financial accounts framework, the impact on the
banking system and the central bank can be represented as follows:
Assets Liabilities
Reserves R Deposits D-d
Loans D-R
CB Deposit Facility max(0, d) CB Borrowing Facility max(0, d)
Table 2.1: Banking sector’s balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Securities S=R+BK Banknotes BK+d
Reserves R
CB Borrowing Facility max(0, d) CB Deposit Facility max (0,−d)
Table 2.2: Central Bank’s balance sheet
Arbitrage requires that the overnight interbank market rate is equal
to the expected end-of-day value of reserves, which is a weighted average of
the two standing facilities rates (Bindseil, 2014). In symbols:
i = P (short)iB+P (long)iD = P (S 6 R+BK+d)iB+P (S > R+BK+d)iD =
= iD + P (S 6 R +BK + d)(iB − iD)
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From the central bank’s balance sheet we have that securities are
equal to the autonomous factors - that is, to all the items which are nei-
ther monetary policy operations nor deposits of banks. In an open economy
with a government sector, net autonomous factors coincide with the sum of
banknotes, government deposits, foreign reserves and the International Mon-
etary Fund’s credit lines. In the stylised financial accounts presented so far,
autonomous factors are equal to banknotes and reserve requirements, so that
S = BK +R. Hence:
i = iD + P (0 6 d)(iB − iD)
Assuming that d is normally distributed, i.e. d ∼ N(0, σd) leads to:
i = iD + φ
(
−S −R−BK
σd
)
(iB − iD)
Thus, the central bank can set the target rate by deciding the bor-
rowing facility rate, the deposit facility rate and by computing the Gaussian
cumulative density function so to calibrate the amount of market securities S
with respect to reserves R and banknotes BK. In other words, if the central
bank wants to change the target interest rate, i∗, it must solve:
i∗ = R +B − (σd)φ−1
(
i∗ − iD
iB − iD
)
Prior the financial crisis, the Eurosystem was operating a symmet-
ric corridor with the open market operations’ volume set by the ECB. In
that period, the level of standing facilities was negligible, thus the interbank
market rate coincided with the main refinancing operation rate - the target
rate of the ECB. This is proof of the good level of confidence that prevailed
among banks, which usually do not borrow reserves from the lending facility
so to avoid the extra cost of signalling to other intermediaries their need
for liquidity. This extra cost is defined as stigma and can be counted as an
additional price paid by banks short of reserves.
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Assets Liabilities
Net Foreign Assets 317 Banknotes 633
Domestic Investment Assets 131 Government Deposits 70
Net Other Autonomous Factors 27
AFA 448 AFL 730
Monetary Policy Operations
Short term credit operations 313
Longer term credit operations 150
Current accounts of banks 182 (186)
Borrowing facility 1 Deposit Facility 1
Sum 913 Sum 913
Table 2.3: Eurosystem, 29 June 2007 (in billion euro). Source: Mercier, 2014.
Starting from October 2008, the ECB shifted to full allotment open
market operations within a corridor set by standing facilities. The main
difference from the case in which the open market operations volume is set
by the central bank is that now banks get whatever quantity of money they
ask for, which is delivered at some fixed rate iOMO ∈ [iD, iB]. Moreover,
iOMO does not necessarily have to be in the middle of the corridor. When
the central bank will act anonymously in the interbank market by purchasing
or selling government’s bonds, banks will bid in the operations such that the
expected interbank rate will be equal to the rate at which the full allotment
OMO is offered i.e.Bid is such that E(i|Bid) = iOMO. This means that:
P (short) =
iOMO − iD
iB − iD
The latter has to be equal to the normal distribution cumulative
function that takes into consideration all the bids made by the banking sector:
iOMO − iD
iB − iD = φ
(
−Bid−R−BK
σd
)
The interbank market short-term rate will be equal to the fixed rate
at which the central bank conducts OMOs if and only if:
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Bid = R +BK − (σd)φ−1
(
iOMO − iD
iB − iD
)
This framework can be represented by the following set of financial
accounts:
Assets Liabilities
Loans D+B Deposits D-d
Reserves R CB credit OMO R +BK − (σd)φ−1
(
iOMO−iD
iB−iD
)
CB Deposit Facility max
(
0,−d− (σd)φ−1
(
iOMO−iD
iB−iD
))
CB Borrowing Facility max
(
0, d+ (σd)φ
−1
(
iOMO−iD
iB−iD
))
Table 2.4: Interbank Market
Assets Liabilities
OMO R +BK − (σd)φ−1
(
iOMO−iD
iB−iD
)
Banknotes BK+d
Reserves of banks R
CB Facility max
(
0, d+ (σd)φ
−1
(
iOMO−iD
iB−iD
))
CB Deposit Facility max
(
0,−d− (σd)φ−1
(
iOMO−iD
iB−iD
))
Table 2.5: Central Bank
The switch from credit to outright open market operations allowed
the ECB to inject reserves at its discretion. This is possible even when
the lower interest bound is reached. Credit operations require instead the
willingness of counterparties to take credit.
2.2 Exceptional measures
Those described in the previous section are the tools employed by the central
bank during normal times. However, economies are often in turmoil when not
experiencing crises and recessions. In such cases, the role of the central bank
is crucial in supporting the financial system by preserving the balance sheets
of financial intermediaries. In doing so, monetary authorities may decide
not only to enhance open market operations or to announce historically-low
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interest rates, but also to use different measures than those listed earlier. Es-
pecially during financial crises, stepping directly into the interbank market is
necessary as the monetary transmission mechanism may be adversely modi-
fied, impaired or even broken. In contrast to interest rate policy, this kind of
interventions result in substantial changes in the central bank balance sheet
in terms of size, composition and risk profile (Borio and Disyatat, 2009). Un-
conventional monetary policies are thus of primary importance when markets
do not respond to interest rate changes, especially when the so called zero
lower bound has been attained. Although central banks have also began to
experiment with negative interest rates, they did so while adopting a wide
range of measures linked to the balance-sheet management. For example,
the ECB moved its deposit rate into negative territory in mid-2014 while
expanding its asset purchase programme and at the same time providing
additional term funding to banks through targeted longer-term refinancing
operations (TLTROs) (Bech and Malkhozov, 2016).
Figure 2.3: Tracking ECB’s policy cycle. Source: Bibow, 2016.
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Balance sheet policies such as corporate bond purchases, forward
guidance and negative policy rates are defined unconventional2 as they go
beyond the task of maintaining the net liquidity deficit equal to zero via
reserves provision. Theoretically, the main outcome should be an increase in
financial asset prices and the consequent shrinkage in yields’ spreads. This
would boost confidence via an upward revision in expectations, ultimately
strenghtening those balance sheets in which financial assets have a prevalent
role. In a world were different kind of such assets are imperfect substitutes
and can become illiquid very quickly, central banks can directly affect the
composition of private portfolios via the rebalancing effect. Banks and finan-
cial intermediaries in general will find convenient to unload those assets that
have been downgraded. In principle, a healthier balance sheet should stim-
ulate lending because of increased lenders’ ratio of capital over risk-weighed
assets and improved availability of good collateral that borrowers can pledge
(Borio and Disyatat, 2009; Gambacorta and Shin, 2016).
Figure 2.4: The transmission mechanism under Asset Purchasing Pro-
grammes Source: Hauskenand and Ncube, 2013
A key feature of balance sheet policies is that they can be entirely
separated from the level of interest rates. The decoupling principle identified
2Rather paradoxically, during the sixties such policies were regarded as part of the
standard central bank’s toolkit. What is atypical is the choice of the particular market
targeted, not the overall approach of seeking to influence specific elements of the trans-
mission mechanism other than the policy rate (Borio and Disyatat, 2009).
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by Borio and Disyatat (2009) and by Fullwiler (2008) holds that the interest
rate can be set independently of the amount of bank reserves in the system:
The same amount of bank reserves can coexist with very dif-
ferent levels of interest rates; conversely, the same interest rate
can coexist with different amounts of reserves (Borio and Disy-
atat, 2009)
Another key point is that excess reserves can be forcely injected
into the banking system, even if banks do not want to hold them.3 With the
target interest rate set at the floor of the corridor, the ECB can now set the
target rate at the level of its choice and simultaneously set the amount of
reserves at the desired level. Whereas endogenous money theory hold that
the supply of reserves is demand determined, by the decoupling principle
there is no relationship anymore between reserves and overnight rates. With
the target overnight rate set at the floor of the corridor, the supply of reserves
can exceed the demand for reserves. The central bank can maintain excess
reserves but this does not necessarily translate into more lending, as banks
may stash excess reserves in the deposit facility or in the reserve account or
in both:
Banks cannot use reserve balances for anything other than set-
tling payments or meeting reserve requirements; reserve balances
do not fund additional lending (Fullwiler, 2008).
Apart from fulfilling any reserve requirements, bank reserves
are uniquely valued by financial institutions because they are the
only acceptable means to achieve final settlement of all trans-
actions. From this perspective, reserves may lay a special role
during times of financial stress, when their smooth distribution
3Together with the fact that the interbank market was not working properly, this is
the main reason why sight deposits have surged since the start of the financial crisis back
in August 2007.
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within the system can be disrupted. At such times, financial in-
stitutions may wish to hold larger reserve balances to manage
their hightened liquidity risk (Borio and Disyatat, 2009).
The fact that excess reserves should not be seen as necessarily con-
ducing to increased lending activity by banks raises a question: why did cen-
tral banks performed exceptional measures, if not to solve the credit crunch?
An explanation is given by Brancaccio and Fontana (2012, 2015), who claim
that monetary policy is conducted to influence the number of insolvencies.
By deciding the interest rate, the central bank actually influences the sol-
vency conditions of firms and households via the discounted value of their
assets and liabilities.
2.2.1 Liquidity trap or balance sheet recession?
From a mainstream point of view, the need for unconventional monetary
policies can be explained with a modified version of the IS-LM model (Hicks,
1937) illustrating the liquidity trap.
The diagram shows a downward-sloping IS schedule, which repre-
sents the fact that investment and saving decisions are negatively affected
by the nominal interest rate. An increase in the latter will be reflected in a
decrease in the former. It is also assumed that investment is always equal to
savings. The LM curve depicts all the possible combinations of the nominal
interest rate, i, and the nominal output, y, corresponding to the equilibrium
in the money market - i.e. to the equality between the money demand and
the money supply, MS, which is assumed to be controlled by the central
bank. The LM curve is flat until a certain combination of the GDP and the
nominal interest rate, beyond which it becomes upward sloping. Higher in-
terest rates shift liquidity preference towards financial assets and away from
cash, except when the interest rate is so low that the public is indifferent in
holding money or buying stocks or bonds. This value of the interest rate is
the zero lower bound, iˆ. According to the quantity theory of money, raising
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Figure 2.5: The liquidity trap Source: Carlin and Soskice, 2006
the amount of the money supply would result in lowering the interest rate
thus boosting the economy via an increase in investment. However, given
that the interest rate cannot be lower than the ZLB, the only effect of an
expansionary monetary policy is to shift the LM schedule rightward. This
changes nothing with respect to the previous situation, as neither the IS curve
nor the output move. Krugman (1998) suggests that one way to escape the
liquidity trap would involve the central bank raising permanently the money
supply. Because of the linear relationship that exists between the quantity
of money and the price level, such a stimulus would shape inflationary ex-
pectations so that economic agents will start to consume and invest more.4
In terms of the diagram, this corresponds to move the IS curve to the right.
4In an open economy model, an expansion of the monetary base would also depreciate
the exchange rate, so that the effect on output would be stronger due to the boost in
exports. However, the current account could not be responding to such a policy, or it
could even worsen if Marshall-Lerner conditions do not hold (Krugman, Obstfeld and
Melitz, 2012).
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The other option for stimulating investment and GDP would be
the use of fiscal policy. Nowadays this is believed not to be a safe option be-
cause of the worrisome level of public debt with which European economies
are overloaded. According to the proponents of austerity, fiscal expansion
has limited effects and would not impact on long-run growth determinants
which are a supply-side problem. This proposition has been summarised as
secular stagnation (Summers, 2014) and it states that the widening gap be-
tween actual and potential GDP is caused by a decline in the equilibrium real
rate of interest. Given that the latter is determined by long-term real eco-
nomic factors and independent from monetary causes, the role of monetary
policy should be to steer market rates to the equilibrium rate (Constancio,
2016). This is exactly the idea behind central banks’ reaction function such
as the Taylor rule, that links the short-term rate of interest to divergences
between actual inflation rates and target inflation rates, and of actual GDP
from potential GDP (Taylor, 1993). But what if the ZLB is actually zero?
Monetary authorities have to come up with something different than trying
to push down the interbank rate, unless they want to experiment with a
negative nominal interest rate policy. The solution envisaged by the Bank
of Japan and then implemented by almost every central bank in the world
has been to conduct asset purchase programmes that have been commonly
termed as quantitative easing (QE). The latter is an example of balance sheet
policy which could in principle be implemented by the government, for ex-
ample by carrying out credit policies. In fact, central banks have a monopoly
over interest rate policy but not over balance sheet policy (Borio and Zabai,
2016).
Apart from dubious assumptions such as the existence of the natural
interest rate and the possibility for the central bank to control the monetary
base, what is missing from the tale of liquidity trap are the balance sheet
effects of low interest rates. A suggested explanation that goes under the
name of balance sheet recession (Koo, 2011) depicts excessively loose mon-
etary policy as the cause, and not the remedy of financial troubles. When
interest rates are so low for so much time, financial bubbles grow until they
burst. Once this happens, borrowers are forced to pay down their debt as
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people with negative equity are not interested in increasing borrowing at any
interest rate, even if the latter is zero. This is because both lenders and
borrowers face a balance sheet inconsistency due to the mismatch between
assets and liabilities. The latter is caused by the decline in the price of assets
which were previously bought with borrowed money. As a result of fire-sales,
leverage L will actually increase rather than fall.
L =
D
A
=
1(
A−D
D
+ 1
)
The ratio of debt, D, to assets, A can be reduced in two ways. The
first one is by increasing net assets, A − D, which can be done via savings
or by replacing debt with equity finance. The second option is to repay debt
holding net assets constant. However, this requires assets to be liquidated,
so that both A and D decrease. Whether the ratio A−D
D
raise or fall depends
on how fast A decrease or increase relative to D, respectively. Let us suppose
that the economy is divided between one sector which wants to develerage
while the other wants to keep accumulating non-equity financial assets - e.g.
debt instruments. If each sector wants to deleverage by redeeming debt
without disposing of debt assets themselves - that is, if each sector wants
to decrease D by keeping constant A - or without higher savings - i.e., by
keeping constant net assets A−D - it can sell equity or non-financial assets.
However, and especially in troubled times, this leads to ‘fire-sales’ which
will put downward pressure on asset prices thus leading to an increase in
aggregate leverage. Moreover, leverage reductions either via savings or by
stockpiling net assets require a parallel increase in net liabilities by those
that would be willing to boost their leverage in order to accommodate the
additional saving by those willing to de-leverage. This is true just because
one sector’s debt is another sector’s asset and will not constitute a problem
as long as there is a sector of the economy which will reduce its savings to
acquire those financial assets that are being sold by the deleveraging sector
(Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013). As an example, when the private sector
is the one that is increasing its savings, either the government or the rest
of the world should dissave in order to restore the three balances identity
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(Godley, 1996) without changing the level of aggregate income:
(S–I) = (G–T ) + (X–M)
where (S − I) is the private sector’s saving position, (G− T ) is the
public deficit and (X−M) is net exports. When (S−I) > 0 the private sector
is deleveraging via assets sales that increase savings. In order to restore the
identity at an unchanged level of income, either the government steps in by
running fiscal deficits - that is, (G−T ) > 0 - or resources are accumulated via
a balance of trade surplus, i.e. (X−M) > 0. If instead the private sector aims
at redeeming debt while continuing to acquire non-equity financial assets,
governments should run fiscal surpluses so that (G−T ) < 0 and (S− I) < 0
provided that the external sector is balanced - that is, (X–M) = 0. This can
more easily be seen by rewriting the previous equation as follows:
(G–T ) = (S–I)− (X–M)
Figure 2.6: Euro area leverage by sector, year-on-year changes in leverage
ratio. Source: Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013
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The act of deleveraging reduces aggregate demand and throws the
economy into recession. Mainstream economics would predict bankruptcy for
those businesses that are paying down debt at a time of zero interest rates
instead of borrowing and investing the money for productive projects. Yet
the private sectors in Japan, the United States, and Europe have all been
increasing savings, thus deeply undermining the effectiveness of monetary
policy (Koo, 2014). So, instead of stimulating investment as predicted by the
IS-LM model, a low cost for borrowing funds has acted as an incentive for
cash hoarding. This leads directly to a fallacy of composition: restructuring
balance sheets in time of crisis is correct at the individual level but not
for the whole economy, as everyone will stop borrowing and spending the
funds that are instead returned to the financial system. This situation is also
called the paradox of debt (Lavoie, 2014; Steindl, 1976) or the paradox of
deleveraging (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013) and it is in many respect
similar to what Keyenes labelled as the paradox of thrift : when all sectors of
the economy simultaneously attempt to increase savings ex ante, the outcome
will be lower GDP rather than higher savings (Keynes, 1936). Again, this is
because individual behaviour can lead to an unintended aggregate result.
The argument of balance sheet recession resembles the debt defla-
tion theory put forward by Irving Fisher (Fisher, 1933). The excessive build
up of debt leads sooner or later to a financial crisis which will manifest itself
as a plunge in the value of assets. Households and businesses will have to pay
out their liabilities and they will do so by running down their deposits and by
selling their assets, thus contributing to asset deflation. Profits will fall and
enterprises will bankrupt, so that unemployment surges and the deflationary
pressure mounts. Moreover, expectations will be negatively affected so to
further dampen investment and to enhance cash hoarding. Again, the mone-
tarist solution would be to increase the money supply in order to implement
a reflation process. But even if the central bank could directly control the
quantity of money in circulation, it would not be able to affect how house-
holds and enterprises will spend the money. In other words, an increase in
the money supply need not to directly translate into a stronger aggregate
demand.
Chapter 3
The ECB and the crisis
If [...] we are tempted to assert that money is the drink which
stimulates the system to activity, we must remind ourselves that
there may be several slips between the cup and the lip.
J. M. Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Money” (1936, Ch. 13)
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in August 2007, the ECB
took more than an active stance in monetary policy. The freezing up of the
interbank market imposed on the central bank the role of dealer between
liquidity-rich and liquidity-poor banks. In fact, the initial dive of the MRO
rate decided by the Governing Council was not enough to restore confidence
among private banks. The main outcome of this situation has been the
credit crunch, meaning that lending towards non-financial institutions and
households suddenly halted. In order to solve the impasse, the ECB decided
to conduct unconventional monetary policies. This chapter will analyse how
the central bank’s balance sheet evolved throughout the implementation of
the various exotic tools that were took off from the Governor’s magic hat.
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3.1 The Eurosystem from 2007 to 2013
The figure below shows how total assets held by the ECB evolved since the
beginning of the great financial crisis (GFC) of 2007. Assets are divided into
four categories: securities, foreign assets, lending and other assets. Each of
this item followed different trends depending on the period considered. Other
assets, foreign assets and lending ballooned at the end of 2008 and then re-
mained more or less constant until a second upsurge registered by mid-2011.
At the end of 2012, the same asset classes started to decline in order to take
off again by end 2014/beginning 2015. As can be roughly assessed from the
graph, the share of lending, foreign assets and other assets over total assets
remained quite the same all over the period considered, except for lending
to euro area credit institutions that increased its share at the beginning of
2012 to then decline by mid-2014. The amount of securities purchased by
the ECB started to raise at the beginning of 2009 and their share increased
until the first quarter of 2012, after which it remained constant until the
beginning of 2015, when it skyrocketed coinciding with the implementation
of the Quantitative Easing.
The liability side highlights more clearly the stop-and-go behaviour
of the ECB’s balance sheet. The variance showed by other liabilities is the
highest, while the amount of currency in circulation has been constantly
increasing since the beginning of the observation period. The recourse to
the deposit facility took off for a short time, approximately from the end of
2011 until the beginning of 2013. Somewhat later, the same happened to the
reserve balance item, which raised again since the first quarter of 2015.
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Figure 3.1: Eurosystem total assets. Source: Borio and Zabai, 2016 3) Securi-
ties of euro area residents and general government debt, in euros. 4) Lending to euro area
credit institutions related to monetary policy operations, in euros. 5) Including US dollar
liquidity auctions. For the euro system this includes all foreign currency claims to both
residents and non-residents of the euro area.
Figure 3.2: Eurosystem total liabilities. Source: Borio and Zabai, 2016 3)
Banknotes in circulation. 4) Current accounts, covering the minimum reserve system.
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3.1.1 The calm before the storm
Table 2.1 in chapter 2 reported the Eurosystem’s simplified balance sheet as
of 29 June 2007, a few weeks before the beginning of the financial crisis orig-
inated from the US sub-prime mortgages market. The Eurosystem balance
sheet results from the consolidation of the balance sheets of the National Cen-
tral Banks and the ECB. Autonomous liquidity factors are displayed both
under the asset and the liability side. As the name suggests, they are not
under the control of the central bank, thus they can be considered as demand-
driven items. Autonomous liquidity factors on the assets side (AFA) contain
foreign and domestic assets, which are managed not for conducting monetary
policy but rather for exchange rate interventions and international stability
purposes. Foreign and domestic assets totalled e448 billions. Autonomous
liquidity factor on the liabilities side (AFL) include banknotes in circulation,
government deposits and a net residual item. The total amount was e730
billion.
The assets side shows also non-autonomous liquidity factors stem-
ming from monetary policy operations. Short-term credit operations refers
to the Main Refinancing Operations (MROs), the instrument of monetary
policy by which the ECB provides liquidity with one-week maturity. Longer-
term refinancing operations (LTROs) are instead used to make available fur-
ther liquidity to the banking sector for longer periods of time starting from
3-months up to 3-years maturities. The borrowing facility, also called the
marginal lending facility (MLF) is an overnight facility used by banks to
cover their end-of-day liquidity needs at an interest rate well above the main
policy rate of the Eurosystem - i.e. the MRO rate. The sum of MROs,
LTROs and MLF was e464 billions. The amount lent by the ECB through
LTROs was half the amount of liquidity provided through MROs, while the
MLF was scarcely used, presumably because of the higher rate compared to
the official rate.
The liabilities side displays also the amount of reserves held by
banks with the Eurosystem. Reserves are kept in a special account managed
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by the ECB called sight deposits account. It contains at least the amount
of reserves that banks are obliged to maintain on 1-month average. Reserve
requirements (RR) are remunerated at the MRO rate, while the excess re-
serves beyond this limit does not benefit from any remuneration. Current
accounts of banks contains both the reserve requirements and the excess re-
serves (ERR), which stood at e186 billions at the end of the July 2007 main-
tenance period, signalling the distaste of banks about maintaining funds in
the deposit facility. The latter is an overnight facility which enables banks to
place their surplus end-of-day liquidity at a rate well below the MRO rate.
At that time, recurrence to the DF consisted in a meagre e1 billion, the
same amount of funds borrowed by banks from the ECB via the MLF.
By the most simple yet fundamental accounting principle, the sum
of liabilities equals the sum of assets:
AFA+MRO + LTRO +MLF = AFL+RR + ERR +DF
The net value of autonomous factors signals the need to borrow
from the central bank and it is defined as the net liquidity deficit (NLF) of
the banking sector:
NLF = AFL− AFA+RR = 730− 449 + 182 = 467
Thus, the net liquidity deficit arises from the fact that autonomous
liquidity factors on the liability side of the central bank plus reserves require-
ments are not enough to cover the autonomous factors on the assets side. A
positive NLF represents a liability of the banking sector versus the central
bank, so the former has to borrow that amount by using any of the available
monetary policy instruments - MROs, LTROs or the MLF. Private banks
can borrow more than needed. In that case, the excess liquidity will have
to show up somewhere on the liability side of the central banks’s balance
sheet - e.g., they could deposit excess money in the sight deposits (Mercier,
2014; Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2012). If instead banks borrow less than
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required, they may use the MLF. This discussion boils down into another ac-
counting identity which states that the net borrowing of the banking sector
(NB) is equal to the sum of MRO, LTRO and MLF minus DF and ERR:
NB = MRO + LTRO +MLF −DF − ERR = 730− 449 + 186 = 467
Indeed, NLF=NB. In order to better understand how banks decide
to allocate what they borrow from the central bank, it is useful to equal the
previous two equations and rearrange them in the following way:
AFL− AFA+RR = MRO + LTRO +MLF −DF − ERR
(MRO + LTRO +MLF )− (AFL− AFA+RR) = DF + ERR
MRO+LTRO+MLF is defined as the gross borrowing and repre-
sents how much the banking sector borrows from the Eurosystem. Banks
can also lend to the central bank by using the deposit facility and by main-
taining sight deposits. The excess liquidity is thus measured by the sum
DF+ERR and it is positive when the gross borrowing of the banking sector
is larger than the actual liquidity deficit. Net borrowing continue to be equal
to the net liquidity deficit while the gross borrowing can be different from
the latter:
• When the gross borrowing equals the net liquidity deficit, there are no
excess reserves or recourse to the deposit facility so that DF+ERR=0.
This was the case in 2007, as gross borrowing was equal to e464 bln,
coinciding with the net liquidity deficit;
• When the gross borrowing is greater than the net liquidity deficit, the
banking sector uses the deposit facility or maintains excess reserves (or
both);
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• When the gross borrowing is less than the net liquidity deficit, excess
reserves become negative. If banks do not borrow reserves from the
central bank by the end of the maintenance period, they have to pay
a particular fine for not fulfilling the reserve requirements imposed by
the Eurosystem.
3.1.2 Clouds approaching
Before thunders from the US financial market could be heard, the European
interbank market was functioning smoothly. Banks were confident and lent to
each other withouth the need for the central bank to act as a dealer between
them. After the financial storm began to approach to the Euro area, the first
response by the overnight market was the freezing up of interbank lending.
This lead to the unprecedented decision of letting the banks to decide how
much liquidity they need when recurring to either the MROs or the LTROs. If
before October 2008 the Eurosystem had controlled the quantity of liquidity
injected into the banking sector, since then it changed the liquidity provision
from supply to demand determined. The new procedure is implemented via
fixed-rate full allotment tenders conducted with different maturities at the
MRO rate. The impairment of the interbank market meant that providing
the banking sector an amount of liquidity equal to the net liquidity deficit
was no longer appropriate, as cash-rich banks are no longer willing to lend
to cash-poor banks (Mercier, 2014).
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Assets Liabilities
Net Foreign Assets 611 Banknotes 857
Domestic Assets 371 Government Deposits 52
Net Other Autonomous Factors 319
AFA 982 AFL 1228
Monetary Policy Operations
SMPA 220 SMPL 157
CBBP 63
MROs 208
LTROs 379
RR+ERR 205 (208)
MLF 1 Deposit Facility 200
Sum 1790 Sum 1790
Table 3.1: Eurosystem, 30 September 2011 (in billion euro). Source: Mercier, 2014
The switch to the fixed rate full-allotment procedure is not the only
change envisaged by the Governing Council. Other two major novelties in the
conduct of the ECB’s monetary policy were approved, namely the Covered
Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) and the Securities Markets Programme
(SMP). The SMP consists in Euro area debt securities purchases occurring
in the secondary market with the scope of mitigating the impairment of the
monetary policy transmission mechanism caused by the malfunctioning of
the sovereign bond markets of Greece, Portugal and Ireland. The liquidity
impact was sterilised through the conduct of weekly fine-tuning operations
(FTOs), which usually take place on a Tuesday as a collection of fixed term
deposits with one-week maturity in a variable rate tender with the rate ap-
plied in MROs as the maximum bid rate. The amount to be absorbed is
equal to the book value of the SMP portfolio at the end of the week preced-
ing the SMP-absorbing fine-tuning operation (Cour-Thimann and Winkler,
2013). In the above balance sheet, the amount of liquidity injected appears
on the asset side (SMPA) while liquidity-absorbing operations appear on the
liabilities side (SMPL). Without such operations, the recourse to the deposit
facility would simply increase by an amount equal to the SMP outstand-
ing amount (Mercier, 2014). The CBPP was implemented in July 2009 and
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consisted in outright purchases of Euro Area covered bonds1 made in both
primary and secondary market. Contrary to what has happened for the
SMP, liquidity injected was not sterilised (Eser et al., 2012). The size of
the programme represented around 2.5% of the total outstanding amount of
covered bonds (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013). Given that government
bonds are purchased in the secondary market, the ECB did not implement
monetary financing of sovereign debts, neither it granted privileged access by
public institutions or governments to financial institutions. The SMP and
the CBPP were conducted for monetary policy purposes consistent with the
primary objective of price stability. Therefore, artt. 123, 124, 125 and 126
of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) were not violated (ibidem).
In computing the gross borrowing both the CBPP and the SMP
programmes have to be taken into considerations. Since SMPA and SMPL
are netted out, the gross borrowing is just equal to:
GB = MRO + LTRO +MLF + CBPP = 205 + 379 + 1 + 63 = 648
Considering that reserves requirements at the end of the current
maintenance period amounted to e208 billions, the net liquidity deficit was
equal to:
NLD = AFL− AFA+RR = 1228− 982 + 208 = 454
The amount of excess liquidity can be computed as:
(MRO + LTRO +MLF + CBPP )− (AFL− AFA+RR) = DF + ERR
1Covered bonds are long-term debt securities issued by banks to refinance loans to
the public and private sectors, often in connection with real estate transactions. Unlike
mortgage-backed securities, covered bonds have the specific legal characteristic of ‘double
protection’: recourse to the issuer as well as additional security provided by the legal
pledge of the assets financed.
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In this case, the sum of deposit facility and of the excess reserves
amounts to e197 billions. The net liquidity defict in June 2007 and Septem-
ber 2011 are very similar (e467 bn and e454 bn, respectively) but the compo-
sition of autonomous factors has evolved. Banknotes in circulation increased
from e683 billions to e857 billions and were compensated by movements in
other autonomous factors. Government deposits decreased from e70 billions
to e52 billions. The gross borrowing was much larger, reaching e651 bn,
and it was reflected by a greater recourse to the deposit facility, which shot
up from e1 billion to e200 billion.
3.1.3 Storm unleashed
The events taking place between 2011 and 2012 required a further enhance-
ment of the measures that were already being implemented. The follow-
ing balance sheet shows how the ECB assets and liabilities evolved. Both
amounted at an unprecedented level of e2,5 billions as of March 2012.
Assets Liabilities
Net Foreign Assets 621 Banknotes 871
Domestic Assets 379 Government Deposits 135
Net Other Autonomous Factors 277
AFA 1013 AFL 1283
USD Repos 53 Claim US Federal Reserve 53
Monetary Policy Operations
SMPA 220 SMPL 220
CBBP 64
MROs 29
LTROs 1100
RR+ERR 91 (104)
MLF 1 Deposit Facility 821
Sum 2468 Sum 2468
Table 3.2: Eurosystem, 2 March 2012 (in billion euro). Source: Mercier, 2014
The first thing to be noticed is the provision of US dollars to Euro
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Area banks via swap arrangements with the Federal Reserve. The latter lent
US dollars to the ECB, which used them to buy dollar denominated assets
held by Euro area banks in order to repay foreign-currency denominated debt.
Being USD repos equivalent to claim that the Federal Reserve had towards
the ECB, the two amounts cancel out and therefore do not affect the liquid-
ity in euro provided by the Eurosystem. Besides this, no new item modified
the balance sheet composition although the amounts at stake have changed
dramatically. Together with the implementation of 3-month, 6-month and
12-month long term refinancing operations, the launch of LTROs with 3-year
maturity2 which occurred on 21 December 2011 and on 26 February 2012 had
substantially reduced the share of MROs. Compared to the amounts regis-
tered on 30 September 2011, the recourse to short term refinancing shrunk
from e208 bn to e29 billions while long-term liquidity provision skyrocketed
to e1100 from e379 bn. Assets continued to be purchased for the same
amount, namely e220 bn through the SMPA and e64 bn via the CBPP,
which was renewed on 14 November 2011 (Eser et al, 2012). All this excess
liquidity returned to the ECB as a huge recourse to the deposit facility, which
amounted to e821 bn compared to e200 bn in September 2011. In fact, the
net liquidity deficit was e387 bn, while the gross borrowing stood at e1194
billions so that sight deposits amounted to the difference between these two
quantities - that is, e821 bn. The volatility of the deposit facility was due
to the increase of excess liquidity, that is the difference between gross and
net borrowing, and not to any change to the net liquidity deficit of the bank-
ing sector. Thus, the Eurosystem was substituting the interbank market by
acting as an intermediary between cash-rich banks that preferred to deposit
excess liquidity in the central bank’s current account rather than lending it
to cash-poor banks (Mercier, 2014). This is also showed in figure 3.2 as a
yellow spike in the usage of deposit facility.
Following the decision of reducing reserve requirements from 2 % to
1 % as part of the package of measures announced by the Governing Council
on 8 December 2011, the current account outstanding amount in March 2012
was e91 billions. This was roughly half of the previous year reserves that
2Also called VLTRO, aka Very Long Term Refinancing Operations
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banks held at the ECB, which amounted to e205 bn (e104 bn versus e208
bn at the end of the respective maintenance periods). It can be noticed that
lower excess reserves imply a larger use of the deposit facility, and vice versa.
This characteristic can be further highlighted by analysing what happened
after the 5th of July 2012, when the Governing Council of the ECB decided to
cut the interest rate of the MROs by 25 basis points to 0.75%, while lowering
the interest rates on both the MLF and the DF by 25 basis points, to 1.50%
and 0.00% respectively. This meant that excess liquidity that private banks
deposited into the ECB via the deposit facility stopped to be remunerated,
making monetary institutions indifferent between keeping funds in excess
reserves and lending them to the central bank.
Assets Liabilities
Net Foreign Assets 648 Banknotes 898
Domestic Assets 351 Government Deposits 132
Net Other Autonomous Factors 421
AFA 999 AFL 1451
USD Repos 31 Claim US Federal Reserve 31
Monetary Policy Operations
SMPA 212 SMPL 212
CBBP 60
MROs 164
LTROs 1084
RR+ERR 480 (107)
MLF 1 Deposit Facility 387
Sum 2561 Sum 2561
Table 3.3: Eurosystem, 13 July 2012 (in billion euro). Source: Mercier, 2014
LTROs continued to be the preferred liquidity provision instrument,
while MROs, CBBP and SMPA played a relatively marginal role. Judging
from the level registered at the end of the maintenance period, reserves held
by private banks in the current account of the ECB were roughly the same
in the two periods considered (March and July 2012), while the recourse
to the deposit facility more than halved (e821 bn compared to e387 bn).
The net liquidity deficit was e559 bn and the gross liquidity borrowing was
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e1319 bn, so that the excess liquidity decreased by e47 bn, down to e760
bn. The behaviour of excess reserves is very different, too. These were
negative in March 2012, when e13 bn were missing, while in July 2012 they
recorded the highest level since June 2007. Contrary to what had happened
before, the reserves account became the preferred way to stash liquidity in the
central bank. The sole observation of the deposit facility would be misleading.
Together with the overall size of the ECB’s balance sheet, the historically high
level of recurrence to the deposit facility is a signal of the malfunctioning of
the overnight market.
3.1.4 Uneasy calm settles
The situation described in the previous section continued until January 2013,
when the banking sector started to pay back the liquidity obtained via LTROs
that took place at least one year before.3 As a consequence, collateral ex-
changed by banks to collect liquidity declined. This is reflected in the lower
level of assets in the central bank’s balance sheet, albeit they increased in
the form of recurrence to MROs. Nevertheless, overall assets and liabilities
were still exceptionally high compared to the levels registered in July 2007.
3In January 2013, when announcing the launch of two VLTROs, the ECB indicated
among the various modalities that “after one year, counterparties will have the option
to repay any part of the amounts they are allotted in the operations, on any day that
coincides with the settlement day of a main refinancing operations” (Mercier, 2014).
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Assets Liabilities
Net Foreign Assets 551 Banknotes 919
Domestic Assets 381 Government Deposits 71
Net Other Autonomous Factors 436
AFA 932 AFL 1426
USD Repos 0 Claim US Federal Reserve 0
Monetary Policy Operations
SMPA 188 SMPL 188
CBBP 59
MROs 914
LTROs 658
RR+ERR 269 (104)
MLF 0 Deposit Facility 46
Sum 1929 Sum 1929
Table 3.4: Eurosystem, 18 October 2013 (in billion euro). Source: Mercier, 2014
Another aspect that contributed to the repayment of LTROs was
the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT), a sovereign
bonds purchasing program designed for countries that apply to the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM)4 for aid and abide by the ESM’s terms and con-
ditions. In case of activation, purchases are made for unlimited amounts on
the secondary market. As it was the case for the SMP, the OMT was officially
presented as a monetary policy tool and did not serve to bailout countries
such as Italy and Spain facing financial difficulties (Cesaratto, 2015). How-
ever, the balance sheet of the Eurosystem does not show any item that can
be related to the OMT simply because it was never triggered. Nonetheless,
it served to reduce the spread between sovereign bonds and to act as an
incentive for returning liquidity to the central bank (Altavilla et al., 2014).
This can be seen both from the fact that the ECB balance sheet shrunk and
from the reduction in the balance of the Trans-European Real-time Gross
settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET2) - the facility that interlinks
4The ESM succeded the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) for issuing debt
instruments in order to finance loans and other forms of financial assistance to euro area
Member States. It made its first intervention when it provided liquidity to Spanish banks
in 2012.
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the national payment systems of those countries belonging to the Euro area.
Figure 3.3: TARGET 2 balances of selected, billions of euro. Source: Bruegel
Institute
Before the GFC, liabilities registered by TARGET2 originated mainly
from peripheral countries trade-balance deficits and were balanced by a cor-
responding amount of capital inflows from the core. These were mainly loans
that banks from core countries made to peripheral financial institutions, the
amount of which is recorded on the financial account of the balance of pay-
ments. When the financial crisis hit the interbank market, cash-rich banks
demanded the repayment of previously extended loans instead of rolling them
over. Deposits started to fly from the periphery back to the core, so that
southern-European banks lost reserves which were replenished mainly by
VLRTOs. If no exceptional refinancing operation had took place, north-
European banks would have not receive back what they lent before the GFC
and a balance of payment crisis originated by a sudden stop would have
probably occurred. As Cour-Thimann (2013) writes:
The emergence of TARGET2 balances within the euro area coun-
tries’ balances of payments can be interpreted as the monetary
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authority having largely substituted for private money flows in
the financing of the cumulated current account deficits of certain
countries [...] Given that the TARGET2 balance is a claim or a
liability vis-a`-vis the ECB, this means that the ECB through its
increased intermediation function largely substituted for the bi-
lateral claims and liabilities contracted in the first place between,
essentially, private agents, and associated in particular with the
countries’ cumulated current account balances [...] Without the
Eurosystem accommodating the liquidity needs of solvent banks
in countries under strain - and in absence of the possibility for
exchange rate realignments within a monetary union - disorderly
adjustments may have arisen, with adverse implications for the
economies, as well as for price stability in the euro area as a
whole.
The recourse to central bank funding is therefore closely linked to
the emergence of significant TARGET2 liabilities for countries mostly af-
fected by the crisis. The repatriation of previous investments and the lack
of renewed lending in crisis-hit countries led to significant net payment in-
flows, a concurrent increase in the TARGET2 claims of the NCBs in the
more resilient countries and an increase in liquidity in the banking systems
of those countries (ECB, 2013). Indeed, liquidity absorption mirrors very
closely overall TARGET2 balances, which are also correlated with liquidity
provision by the Eurosystem. While aiming at supporting banks and helping
to smooth the balance of payments’ adjustments in the European Monetary
Union, refinancing operations indirectly provided funds to finance current
account imbalances (Cour-Thimann, 2013; Cesaratto, 2015). This is why
some economists raised the issue of a stealth bailout being automatically
conducted by the functioning of TARGET2 (Sinn, 2011; Cesaratto, 2013).
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Figure 3.4: TARGET2 balances versus overall liquidity provision and ab-
sorption and excess liquidity, billions of euro. Source: Cour-Thimann, 2013
The aumount of liquidity provided by different kinds of LTROs
increased steeply until the famous Mario Draghi speech at the Global Invest-
ment Conference in London on 26 July 2012, when he announced: “within
our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro.
And believe me, it will be enough”. After this statement, and also because of
the OMT announcement that took place on the 6th September 2012, finan-
cial capital started to flow again from the core to the periphery. Again, the
justification for acting as lender of last resort was for improving monetary
policy transmission and not to avoid another sovereign debt crisis that hit
Italy and Spain during the summer of 2012 (Cesaratto, 2015). In any case,
confidence in financial markets was restored so that the reimbursement of
refinancing operations coincided with a plunge in the value of the deposit
facility, accompanied by a small increase in excess reserves.
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3.2 Wind of change
Being the deposit rate already zero from 5 July 2012 onwards, the ECB
considered the possibility of reducing also the marginal lending rate and
the main refinancing rate to values close or equal to zero. Once attained,
the zero lower bound (ZLB) would impede the central bank to influence
further long-term interest rates. Ultimately, this results in an impairment
of the conventional monetary transmission mechanism that considers the
interest rate as the main tool to influence aggregate demand. One way to
force down long-term rates is to use forward guidance, as the Governing
Council did by announcing that it was expecting “[...] the key ECB interest
rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time”.
How long it will take before the interest rate corridor will be shifted up is
not known in advance. Given the symmetrical ECB’s role in maintaining
price stability - that is, to keep year-on-year inflation rate as measured by
a change in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro
area below 2% - it is reasonable to believe that interest rates will not be
raised until the Eurozone growth will start to recover significantly. Contrary
to forecasts, both GDP and inflation did not take off and the ECB faced the
ghost of another debt crisis. The need for further actions can be inferred by a
speech held in Jackson Hole the 22 August 2014. In this occasion, the ECB’s
president Mario Draghi worried about the lack of aggregate demand and the
hysteresis effects caused by years of prolonged unemployment (Draghi, 2014).
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Figure 3.5: Eurosystem monetary policy operations, billions of euro. Source:
ECB, 2015
Despite the launch of new long-term refinancing operations, banks
continued to return liquidity to the ECB. In particular, three-years LTROs
were completely dismissed at the beginning of 2015 although they have been
representing the bulk of monetary policy effects in the previous years, espe-
cially between 2012 and 2013. As a consequence, recourse to deposit facil-
ity and daily reserve surplus registered a constant slowdown. By September
2014, liquidity parked in the central bank’s balance sheet was at its minimum.
Moreover, liquidity-absorbing fine tuning operations were discontinued. This
coincided with the decision of another set of measures which apparently were
just a sequel of those previously adopted. The first of such tools were Tar-
geted Long-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs), which were allotted
twice (September and December 2014). The maximum amount of liquidity
can cumulatively reach up to three times each counterparty’s net lending to
the euro area non-financial private sector, excluding loans to households for
house purchase. In this way, banks should have an incentive in lending to
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the industrial sector, which is the ultimate target of such operations. LTROs
are conducted quarterly and will last up to 4 years, but financial institutions
have the option to repay any part of the amounts they were allotted. The
interest rate on the TLTROs will be fixed over the life of each operation at
the rate on the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations prevailing at the
time of take-up, plus a fixed spread of 10 basis points (ECB, 2014). All these
measures continued to let banks to be free in choosing the amount of liquidity
they need, so that the ECB could not forcely inject money in the economy.
The demand for liquidity has been stagnant at least from middle-2012 until
middle-2015, except for a few spikes that can be noticed at the beginning of
2013, in the middle of 2014 and at the beginning of 2015. Nonetheless, the
Governing Council decided that more liquidity was needed, so it came up
with a new idea.
3.2.1 Quantitative Easing
The implementation of TLTROs was accompanied by the third edition of the
Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBBP3), with which the ECB intended
to purchase a broad portfolio of euro-denominated covered bonds issued by
monetary financial institutions domiciled in the euro area. The other supple-
mentary policy tool was the Asset Backed Securities Purchase Programme
(ABSPP) by which the central bank will purchase a broad portfolio of simple
and transparent ABS with underlying assets consisting of claims against the
euro area non-financial private sector under an ABS purchase programme
(Borio and Zabai, 2016). However, the total amount of these two measures
was quite small, as monthly purchases totalled approximately e10 billions.
The big novelty was instead represented by the so called Quantitative Eas-
ing (QE), officially called Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP). The
PSPP incorporated both the ABSPP and the CBPP3, and was announced
on 22 January 2015. Under the QE, the Eurosystem pledged to buy sovereign
bonds from euro-area governments and securities from European institutions
and national agencies. Purchases started on 9 March 2015 and were meant
to last at least until September 2016. The deadline for the QE was extended
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in December 2015, when the ECB’s president announced that purchases will
continue at least until March 2017 and, in any case, until the central bank
sees “a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation which is consistent with
the aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2 percent over the
medium term” (Draghi, 2015). The additional e50 billion will be directed
towards the PSPP: the amount of debt of supranational institutions located
in the euro area to be purchased is e6 billion per month, while the remain-
ing e44 billion will be used mainly to buy sovereign debt securities in the
secondary market. These are divided into e4 billions (8% of e50 bn) held by
the ECB and e40 billion held by the national central banks. In terms of al-
location by country, the e44 billions are split beween all euro-area countries
according to the ECB capital keys - i.e. the NCB’s share of ECB’s capital
(Claeys et al., 2015).
Figure 3.6: Allocation of monthly asset purchases by the Eurosystem.
Source: Claeys et al., 2015
The amount of assets to be purchased is e60 billion per month,
of which approximately e10 billion will continue to be devoted to covered
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bonds and asset backed securities. The Governing Council decided to put in
place a 25% issue limit and a 33% issuer limit on Eurosystem holdings. The
first limit is imposed to prevent the ECB from having the power to vote in
favour of restructurings that could be interpreted as monetary financing of a
member state.5 The 33% issuer holdings limit is implemented with the aim of
preserving market functioning and allowing the formation of a market price
on a given security (ECB, 2015). This market-neutrality behaviour is also
reflected by the maturity distribution of purchased sovereign bonds, which
mimics the current relative frequence of such assets. In any case, purchases
must be such that PSPP holdings plus SMP and other previous holdings do
not violate the aggregate 33% limit, while cumulated PSPP purchases do not
violate the 25% issue limit.
Figure 3.7: Evolution of Eurosystem sovereign holdings for Greece. Source:
Claeys et al., 2015
5On 2 February 2012, the ESM treaty mandated the inclusions oc Collective Ation
Clauses (CACs) in all new euro-area government securities, with maturity above one year
as on 1 January 2013. This meant that alternations in the terms and conditions of a bond
issue have to be approved at a bond-holder meeting with a majority of 75%. In other
words, if the Eurosystem were to hold more than 25% of a single issue, it would be able
to block a vote (Claeys et al., 2015).
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Figure 3.8: Evolution of Eurosystem sovereign holdings for Germany. Source:
Claeys et al., 2015
A further update of the QE was announced on 10 March 2016,
the day in which the Governing Council decided to add a corporate sector
purchase programme (CSPP) to the asset purchase programme (APP). The
CSPP started in June 2016 and consisted in outright purchases of investment-
grade euro-denominated bonds issued by non-bank corporations established
in the euro area. Such purchases have to be carried out by six Eurosystem na-
tional central banks (NCBs): Banque Nationale de Belgique, Deutsche Bun-
desbank, Banco de Espan˜a, Banque de France, Banca d’Italia, and Finlands
Bank. Each NCB is responsible for purchases from issuers in a particular
part of the euro area. The ECB will coordinate the purchases, which will be
conducted in the primary and secondary markets. No primary market pur-
chases will involve debt instruments issued by entities that qualify as public
undertakings, so to abide artt. 123 and 125 of the TFEU. Debt instruments
denominated in euro will be eligible for purchase, provided they are eligible
as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations. Such debt instruments must
have a rating at least equivalent to the investment grade (rating of BBB-)
obtained from an external credit assessment institution and they must have
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a minimum remaining maturity of six months and a maximum remaining
maturity of 30 years at the time of purchase. The issuer must be a corpora-
tion established in the euro area, defined as the location of incorporation of
the issuer. Corporate debt instruments issued by corporations incorporated
in the euro area whose ultimate parent is not based in the euro area are also
eligible for purchase under the CSPP, provided they fulfil all the other eligi-
bility criteria. Finally, the issuer of the debt instrument cannot be a credit
institution (ECB, 2016).
Figure 3.9: Monthly purchases under the three asset purchase programmes
of the ECB, ebillions. Source: Demertzis and Wolff, 2016
Chapter 4
Not all that glitters is gold
My remedy in the event of the obstinate persistence of the slump
would consist, therefore, in the purchase of securities by the
central bank until the long-term market rate of interest has been
brought down to the limiting point.
J. M. Keynes, “A Treatise on Money” (1930)
Together with the enhancement of LTROs, ECB’s QE aims at
achieving asset purchases for a total amount of more than e2 trillions. The
primary objective is the fulfillment of a yearly rate of inflation close but be-
low 2%, which should kick-start lending, stimulate investments and increase
consumption. This chapter will assess if such outcomes have effectively been
realised so far. The main focus will be on the recent developments of the
asset purchase program, the PSPP. Various economic variables and statis-
tical indicators will be used to prove whether the European economy has
effectively improved. Some caution is needed for judging the ECB’s mone-
tary policy. Given the fact that the TLTRO was announced close to the QE,
and cuts to the deposit rate into negative territory were implemented at the
same time, one must bear in mind that separating the contributions of each
of these policies is almost impossible. This is recognised even by authors such
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as Wieladek and Pascual (2016), who examined the impact of the ECB’s QE
on euro area real GDP and core CPI with a Bayesian VAR to conclude that
in absence of the first round of ECB QE, the two economic variables would
have been 1.3% and 0.9% lower, respectively. No counterfactual exists in or-
der to understand what would have been the economic destiny of Euro area
countries had the QE not been implemented. No natural experiments can be
run in economics and no instrumental variable can be plugged into an econo-
metric model to separate the contribution of on inflation, GDP, employment,
investments and exchange rate from the influence of other economic variables
that were operating at the same time. Although useful, such exercise would
not add so much to what can be acknowledged by a rigorous scrutiny of
descriptive statistics. Together with the fact that no extended time series
are available, this is the main reason why an inductive process (Toporowski,
2002) is used in order to describe the ECB’s monetary policy outcomes.
4.1 Inflation
The main channel through which assets purchasing programmes should de-
liver the expected result is inflation. By buying sovereign and corporate
bonds, the central bank pushes up their price and exert a downward pressure
on yields. Bondholders should be better off due to the fact that their real
wealth is now increased, thus their budget constraint is relaxed and expen-
diture can be increased. This should stimulate consumption and investment,
two of the main components of aggregate demand, and thus the price level
should be raised accordingly. However, it may be the case that the substi-
tution effect would be greater than the wealth effect, especially if financial
assets are held because of their yield and not with the purpose to be sold in
the secondary market for realising a capital gain. In this case, low interest
rates on bonds could trigger a search for riskier assets that should deliver
a higher income. This effect is called the portfolio-rebalancing channel and
it is particularly important for financial institutions that make a large use
of government securities in order to secure themselves a positive stream of
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payments.
The other explanation for expecting a boost in inflation through
financial asset purchases is the positive correlation between bank deposits and
the price level that the quantity theory of money predicts. The QE should
increase the level of bank reserves, so that financial institutions’ liquidity
is enhanced. As a consequence, lending will be stimulated, so that both
consumption and investments will benefit from it.
Figure 4.1: Euro area inflation. Source: ECB, author’s computations.
January 2015, the month of the announcement of the PSPP, was
the month with the lowest rate of inflation in the euro area ever, -0.6%. After
the Governing Council revealed the launch of QE, there was a small initial
increase in prices. Inflation reached a peak of 0.3% in May 2015, the third
month of government bond purchases. However, this increase was short-lived
and the rate of inflation progressively declined for the following five months.
It has drifted between -0.1% and 0.3 percent, falling to -0.2% in April 2016,
and -0.1% in May. Inflation emerged again from negative territory in October
and achieved the value of 0.3% in January, before falling to -0.2% in February.
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In the twelve months before the ECB launched its QE programme, inflation
averaged 0.2% per month. Since launching its programme, inflation has
performed at a slightly lower level of 0.1%. However, inflation is affected by
movements in oil prices and other inputs, therefore one should look at core
inflation when assessing the effects of asset purchases. Indeed, the HICP and
core inflation are robustly correlated throughout the entire period considered.
Core inflation averaged 0.76% in the year before the QE programme began;
and has averaged just 0.87% since the programme was implemented (Van
Lerven, 2016; Demertzis and Wolff, 2016). This somewhat meagre increase
of 0.11% average core inflation still suggests that QE is not having its desired
impact on prices. The 2% increase in the price level set as a target by the
ECB is very far to be attained. One should also consider the fact that the
Euro area inflation rate is the average change in the level of prices measured
at the country level. Such an aggregate variable hide the heterogeneity that
is unveiled by looking at the inflation rate of the singular member states of
the monetary union.
4.2 GDP and investment
Euro area GDP experienced negative growth rates twice, thus representing
an example of what can be defined as a double-dip recession. The first slump
started in the third quarter of 2008 and lasted until the first quarter of 2010.
During this time, a trough amounting to almost -5% real GDP growth rate
was attained. The second recession was registered from the last quarter of
2011 and stopped by the third quarter of 2013. While being less severe, it
lasted more than the first. GDP growth rate have not been able to achieve
the same speed as was registered before the great financial crisis, as it was
fluctuating below 2% since the last quarter of 2014. After the second dip,
the highest GDP growth rate was reached after the start of the ECB’s PSPP,
but it then declined to 1.7% during 2016 Q1 (Demertzis and Wolff, 2016).
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Figure 4.2: Contributions to real GDP growth, percentage points. Source:
Demertzis and Wolff, 2016
Notes: 1) Whatever it takes 2) Announcement and start of PSPP 3) CSPP and expansion
of PSPP. NPISH is Non-profit institutions serving households.
The big absent from contributions to GDP growth is indeed invest-
ment as measured by gross capital formation, which declined sharply. Being
the main driver of growth (Kalecki, 1954; Keynes, 1936), it is no surprise
that its catastrophic reduction was the main symptom of both recessions.
Even if investment started to grow again after the end of the first dip, the
modest recovery registered between 2010 Q2 and 2011 Q3 was not enough
in order to rebuild the productive capacity that was blown away by the re-
cession. Gross capital formation reached again negative territory during the
second downturn and it has never fully restored since then. Albeit with a
smaller magnitude, households’ consumption expenditure followed the same
path, while general government expenditure and net exports have been coun-
tercyclical most of the time. Exported goods and services to the rest of the
world have showed negative growth rates during the first recession, while
they have been positive since Q4 2009, which coincided with the last quar-
ter of the first dip. Some months before, the whatever it takes speech by
Mario Draghi took place. From then until the first quarter of 2013, exports
have been positively growing, even during the second recession, after which
only consumption and government expenditure showed weak signs of recov-
ery. The anaemic GDP growth, together with increasing probability of a
deflationary economic environment, were among the reasons that pushed for
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the implementation of the PSPP. Few months after, the PSPP was expanded
and the CSPP was activated. Nevertheless, GDP growth rate did not react
as expected: with a post hoc ergo propter hoc approach, one might deduce
that the start of the PSPP has led to an increase in GDP growth rate due to
the increase in net exports, household expenditure and investment. However,
the initial positive effect vanished after just three quarters, when the overall
output of the Euro area economy actually fall in coincidence with the boost
in the monthly amount of purchased assets. Moreover, the investment rate
have never took off and was declining as well during the first quarter of 2016.
Figure 4.3: Selected Euro-area countries’ gross fixed capital formation, per-
centage of GDP, current prices. Source: Eurostat, author’s computation.
Of all Euro-area countries, only Germany, Austria, and to a lesser
extent France have been able in maintaining the share of investment un-
changed throughout troubled times. Peripheral member states such as Greece,
Italy and Spain suffered the most. For instance, Spain’s share of investment
as a percentage of its nominal GDP swung from 31% in 2007 to 21.4% in 2015,
losing more than 10 percentage points whereas Germany’s share fluctuated
around 20% of its national output. The same dynamic applies at the Euro
area level, as gross fixed capital formation averaged 21% of Euro-area GDP
with a standard deviation equal to 1.21. The disappointing performance of
investment can be linked to the balance sheet recession theory explained in
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Chapter 2. Before the crisis, additional debt was used to buy housing and
other assets whose values subsequently crashed. Ever since, households and
firms have been cutting back consumption and investment in order to pay
down debt. However, the dynamics at play could differ among Euro area
countries. As an illustration, the Italian debt position vis-a`-vis the Eurosys-
tem has been constantly increasing from e249 billion registered at the end
of 2015 up to e289 billion recorded at the end of June 2016. The widening
of TARGET2 imbalances reflected capital outflows originating from Italian-
private assets’ sales and net purchases of foreign assets made by residents,
which were only partially relieved by Italian banks’ net funding from abroad
(Banca d’Italia, 2016). The current picture is quite similar to what happened
back in 2011-2012, when the fear of a Euro-area breaking up resulted in finan-
cial outflows which originated a steep downfall of TARGET2 balance. The
great deficit was partially reduced by the July 2012 OMT announcement,
meaning that foreign investors started to buy again Italian assets, and that
residents brought back the money that was previously sent to safer coun-
tries such as Germany (Cecioni and Ferrero, 2012). On the contrary, the
implementation of the QE was not translated into higher domestic liquidity,
as Italian foreign investments show a positive trend. Whereas in the period
2011-2012 residents had to repatriate financial capital in order to pay their
debts and to avoid the difficulties of obtaining new loans, from January 2014
until June 2016 liquidity was so abundant that portfolio investments surged
to e265 billion. In particular, foreign investment funds totalled e160 billion,
while e10 billion were used to buy foreign stocks and e95 billion were put
into foreign bonds. Central bank’s liquidity played a major role in financ-
ing such investments, as non-residents purchases of Italian assets had been
slowing down since 2015.
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Figure 4.4: TARGET2 and balance of payment, Italy. Monthly data, billions
of euro. Source: Economic bulletin, July 2016, Bank of Italy. Author’s
translation.
4.3 Bond yields, bank lending and exchange
rate
One of the main indicators of the Euro-area crisis was the staggering growth
in sovereign bond yields that took place in the summer of 2011, especially in
countries such as Spain and Italy which experienced abnormally high debt
service (10-year bond yields reached 7.6 percent and 6.5 percent, respec-
tively). This was the result of the contagion from the initial upswing in bond
yields in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. As a consequence, financial markets
undertook a flight to safety by selling peripheral countries’ bonds and by
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investing in the German bund, so that the term spread diverged until the
ECB stepped in by announcing that it was ready to do whatever it takes in
order to preserve the Euro.
Figure 4.5: Ten-year government bond spreads against Germany, percent-
age points. Source: Demertzis and Wolff, 2016 Notes: 1) Whatever it takes 2)
Announcement and start of PSPP 3) CSPP and expansion of PSPP.
OMT announcement had a significant impact on bond yields in
Italy and Spain, particularly within the range of maturities targeted by the
ECB’s purchases in secondary markets. Italian and Spanish 2-years bond
yields declined by more than 2 percentage points in less than few days. At
the same time, yields for similar maturities of Germany and France were not
significantly affected. This was a remarkable result compared to the effects
that the QE should have been exerting on the same variable. Perhaps the
PSPP has not been equally successful because of the limited amount of assets
that the central bank purchased in secondary sovereign bond markets. In
fact, after the announcement and the implementation of the QE, bond yields
and the term spread were only weakly cut, and at a slower pace than in the
case of the OMT announcement which took place in July 2012 (Altavilla et
al., 2014).
A peculiar side effect of reducing sovereign bond yields is the neg-
ative impact on the profitability of banking activity. Financial institutions
such as private banks and pension funds hold a good deal of such securi-
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ties as a risk-free and interest-bearing alternative to simply hoarding cash
in form of banknotes. Negative deposit facility interest rates are contribut-
ing in further affecting bank profitability by squeezing net interest margins,
the main source of revenue for many banks. Moreover, the growing amount
of non-performing loans (NPLs) is increasing the pressure for finding highly
remunerative but riskier activities. Figures elaborated by the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS) show that the profitability of major banks in the
Euro area have been lower in 2015 as compared to the 2009-2012 average.
For instance, last year German banks’ net income decreased by 25 percentage
points with respect to the average figure computed for the period 2009-2012
(BIS, 2016) These results are also confirmed by the Euro area lending sur-
vey, in which banks reported that the APP had a negative impact on their
profitability (ECB, 2016a).
Figure 4.6: Euro area lending, billion of euro. Source: ECB, author’s com-
putation.
The escape from low profitability resulted in stagnant lending ac-
tivity which could not even be restored by the huge amounts of liquidity
injected by the ECB through all sort of refinancing operations and asset pur-
chase programmes. An assessment of the strategy put forward by financial
intermediaries can be extrapolated from the April 2016 Euro area lending
survey, in which ad hoc question A3 asked the following: “Over the past six
months, for what purposes has your bank used the additional liquidity arising
from the ECB’s expanded asset purchase programme? And for what purposes
will such liquidity be used over the next six months?” (ECB, 2016b). In
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other words, did the QE program, among other things, expand lending? The
answer is showed in the following chart.
Figure 4.7: Euro area lending decisions. Source: ECB (2016b)
Close to zero respondents said that the increased liquidity “has con-
tributed considerably” to granting loans to non-financial corporations, house-
holds for housing, or for consumer credit to households. An overwhelming
majority said that the increased liquidity has had and will not have any im-
pact on such lending. As Borio and Disyatat from the BIS put it: “[...] the
level of reserves hardly figures in banks’ lending decisions. The amount of
credit outstanding is determined by banks’ willingness to supply loans, based
on perceived risk-return trade-offs and by the demand for those loans” (Bo-
rio and Disyatat, 2009).1 Lending is not determined by the supply of central
bank reserves, but endogenously by demand from the private sector for new
loans. Accordingly, if there is weak demand for new loans, and banks are
fearful of lending in a depressed economy, then bank lending to the private
1This precise words were quoted by Vitor Constancio, vice-president of the ECB, during
a speech given at the 26th International Conference on Interest Rates, Frankfurt am Main,
8 December 2011 (Constancio, 2011).
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sector will not increase regardless of how much new central bank reserves
are injected into the system. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the last
lending survey conducted by the ECB found that most of euro-area banks
did not increase their lending neither as a result of QE nor as a result of
LTROs. Moreover, participation to the last round of long-term refinancing
operations was mainly driven by profitability motives (ECB, 2016b). This
confirms what post-Keynesian theory has always advocated: banks do not
‘lend out’ neither reserves nor deposits. The causality actually works in re-
verse: when a bank makes a new loan, it simply taps some numbers into a
computer and creates brand new money ‘out of thin air’, which it then de-
posits into the borrower’s account. Only then, if it has insufficient reserves,
does the bank turn to the central bank, which is obliged to provide reserves
on demand. Even if an argument can be made that conditions are improving
albeit at extremely slow pace, it is important to note that this was the case
even before the announcement of QE (Van Lerven, 2016).
Another side effect of the PSPP should be the exchange rate de-
preciation. As financial assets’ yields are pushed downwards, investors will
substitute domestic for foreign bonds. In order to do so, they must convert
euros into the currency in which the asset they intend to buy is priced - e.g.
US dollars or Japanese Yen. The standard international economics textbook
model predicts that the exchange rate of the funding currency will be revised
upwards. This makes domestic products cheaper than foreign ones, so that
European trade balance vis-a`-vis the rest of the world should improve, unless
the increase in import prices is greater than the lower cost of exports.
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Figure 4.8: USD/EUR exchange rate and Euro area current account balance,
quarterly change. Source: ECB, author’s computation.
Judging from the chart above, QE has likely had a significant ef-
fect on the exchange rate. Taking as reference the price of US dollars in
terms of euros, an exchange rate depreciation has occurred even before the
announcement of the PSPP (January 2015) but when rumors started about
its implementation started to spread among financial markets participants.
However, it is almost impossible to assert how the normalisation of the mone-
tary policy conducted by other central banks affected the exchange rate. For
instance, when the Fed announced its willingness in keeping constant the
fund rate, financial flows may have been redirected to the other side of the
Atlantic. The effects on the current account balance are difficult to judge.
While the trend has been towards a surplus which was maintained from 2012
Q2, it appears that although the exchange rate declined from 2014 Q3, the
trade balance first dropped, then climbed up during the second quarter of
2015 and then fell again until 2016 Q1. It is therefore unclear whether the
exchange rate depreciation was beneficial or detrimental for the Euro-area
balance of trade. An important role is also played by the level of aggregate
demand, which might better explain the movements in exports and imports.
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4.4 Stock prices, dividends and inequality
The ECB’s QE was also designed to drive down long-term interest rates,
inducing portfolio investors to shift from bonds to stocks. This portfolio
substitution strategy would increase share prices, raising household wealth
and therefore consumer spending. Stock indexes should reflect this positive
effect by showing a general increase in share prices. This was indeed the
case for the Euro Stoxx Price Index, which exhibited a rising growth rate
right after the announcement and the implementation of the PSPP. However,
market exuberance was short-lived as stock prices declined starting from the
first quarter of 2015. Even if a weak upswing took place between 2016 Q1
and 2016 Q2, it is difficult to say if it was because of the improvement of
the ECB’s QE or if it was just a follow-up of the S&P 500 Composite Index.
In fact, the two indexes are very correlated but only US stocks have more
than recovered from the 2007 financial crisis. On the contrary, Euro area
shares are quite far from the peak registered before the first big tumble, as
more than 1000 points are needed for going back to the pre-crisis market
capitalisation.
Figure 4.9: Euro area Stoxx Price Index and U.S. S&P 500, quarterly change.
Source: ECB, author’s computation.
Given the general tendency in growing stock prices, the rational be-
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haviour to be adopted by corporations should be to issue shares. Especially
in a context of balance sheet recovery, this strategy should be the preferred
one in order to raise equity and decrease leverage. This was indeed the case
for most non-financial (NFC), financial (FC) and monetary financial institu-
tions (MFI) in the euro area since 2007. The chart below shows this trend by
depicting net issued shares - new corporate stock issues minus outstanding
stock retired through stock repurchases and M&A activity. Apart from the
period Q4 2007 - Q3 2008 and the period Q1 2013 - Q3 2013, net issued
shares have been positive. NFCs and other MFIs constitutes the bulk of
issuers, while FCs and MFIs have always played a minor role.
Figure 4.10: Euro area net issued shares, quarterly data, millions of euro.
Source: ECB, author’s computation.
It seems therefore that the ECB has successfully restored market
confidence. However, this result applies to the euro area as a whole but it
may mask what is occurring at the Member State level. As an example, the
Italian Commissione nazionale per le societa` e la borsa (CONSOB) published
data on listed companies which clearly shows that the increasing distribu-
tion of dividends goes together with a fall in issued shares. The amount of
resources raised in the Italian stock market tumbled by e7 billions, from
e11.6 bn in 2014 to e4.6 bn in 2015. At the same time, shareholders were
entitled with e15.4 billions while M&A activities dried another e5.4 billions
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from corporates’ balance sheets as shown by the increasing amount of Initial
Pubblic Offerings (IPOs), which grew by e4.7 bn (CONSOB, 2016). As a
result, net equity issues decreased further from e−2.8 billions in 2014 to
e−16.1 bn thus confirming the de-equitisation process started in the after-
math of the great financial crisis. This is a worrisome trend that has been
going on in the U.S. economy since the beginning of the 80ies, coinciding
with market-friendly policy that secured the way for the shareholder maxi-
mizing value mantra (Lazonick, 2015). This process also offer an explanation
of why investment is so weak: by distributing more than it is collected, finan-
cial markets are increasingly focusing on a short-term strategy which is not
coherent with the retain-and-reinvest approach needed for investment in real
growth. In this context, asset purchases conducted by the central bank may
do more harm than good. Rather than investing the proceeds of corporate
bonds bought by the ECB via the CSPP program, companies are engaging
in a carry trade by buying their own shares or by distributing dividends.2
This would exacerbate the already worrisome level of financialisation3 of the
economy, which poses severe risks both for real GDP growth and financial
stability. An excessive level of market confidence sooner or later becomes
market euphoria, which suddenly busts and leads to economic depression.
Economic policies that aims at stabilising the financial system in the short
run are instead de-stabilising it in the medium-long run (Minsky, 1986; 1992).
2The fact that bonds bought by the ECB must be denominated in euro does not neces-
sarily imply that the issuing company’s nationality belongs to the euro area. Multinational
companies have the possibility of issuing bonds denominated in euro which can be bought
by the central bank.
3Defined as the rise in size and dominance of the financial sector relative to the non-
financial one, as well as the diversification towards financial activities in non-financial
corporations.
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Figure 4.11: Italian net issued shares, billions of euro. Source: CONSOB,
2016.
The commitment towards shareholders’ value maximisation has af-
fected not only non-financial and financial corporations, but also monetary
financial institutions such as banks. The BIS has warned against the exces-
sive distribution of dividends occurred from 2007 until 2014, the last year for
available data. The chart on the left hand side shows that retained earnings
fluctuated quite substantially and no clear trend exists, while cumulative
dividends from 2007 have been constantly growing. By the end of 2014, the
total retained earnings of the 90 euro-area banks sample stood at e261 bil-
lions. Meanwhile, the accumulated dividends for this group of banks since
2007 amounted to e196 billions. This means that the retained earnings of
these banks would have been 75% higher in 2014, had the banks chosen to
plough back the profits into their own funds rather than paying them out as
dividends. The chart on the right hand side shows instead the distribution
of retained earnings and cumulative dividends in 2014. For the subsample of
banks from Spain, France and Italy, retained earnings would have been more
than double what it was at the end of 2014, had profits been ploughed back
into the bank (Shin, 2016).
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Figure 4.12: Total retained earnings and accumulated dividends of a group
of 90 euro area banks, billions of euros. Source: Shin, 2016.
Retained earnings are the main contribution to bank capital, an
important determinant both for bank lending and for interbank borrowing:
the more capital a bank has, the more own funds it has to lend out and
the lower is the recourse to the central bank’s borrowing facility. A higher
amount of bank’s capital is often associated with lower leverage, defined as
equity-to-total-assets ratio. The lower the leverage, the lower is the default
risk thus the smaller is the cost of borrowing funds from other banks. The
BIS estimates that a 1 percentage point increase in the bank leverage is
associated with a 4 basis points reduction in the cost of borrowed funds for
the bank, a higher speed in raising borrowed funds and a 0.6 percentage point
uptick in the subsequent growth in lending (Gambacorta and Shin, 2016).
This is further evidence in support of the endogenous money theory, by which
lending decision are not taken by looking at how much deposits or reserves
the lender already has, but rather by assessing the expected profitability of
the transaction and the credit score of the borrower. If the aim of monetary
policy is to induce banks to lend and do so in a way that is sustainable
over the cycle, securing a high level of bank capital is vital. Flooding the
banking system with an unprecedented amount of liquidity is not going to
restore lending activity, but it is rather going to encourage the erosion of
bank capital thus creating a moral hazard scenario. Banks know that they
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can rely on the central bank for meeting their reserve requirements and they
will do so especially when the interbank market is not working properly. In
these circumstances, banks have no interest in strengthening their financial
soundness as they are encouraged in eroding their capital.
Figure 4.13: Bank capital and loan growth. Source: Gambacorta and Shin,
2016.
Another answer to the question as to why banks have been so re-
luctant to plough back their profits into their own funds is the perverse
incentives that shareholders and managers have:
When the bank’s share price is substantially below the book value
of the bank’s equity, shareholders may feel they can unlock some
value from their shareholding by paying themselves a cash div-
idend, even at the expense of eroding the bank’s lending base.
As many of the shareholders are asset managers who place great
weight on short-term relative performance in competition against
their peers, the temptation to raid the bank’s seed corn may be-
come too strong to resist. The bank’s management, for their part,
may see the lower capital base as unobjectionable if it means that
they can meet their return-on-equity target more easily by reduc-
ing the base for the calculation of return-on-equity (Shin, 2016).
This explanation is very much in line with that one given by Lazon-
ick (2015), but it focus too much on the supply of credit. The demand for
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loans is also important for understanding why bank lending has been only
partially recovering since the financial crisis. In a context of high uncertainty,
low investments and stagnant wages, low recurse to borrowing is not a big
surprise.
Figure 4.14: Stocks and housing drive the asset return differential, percentage
points. Source: Domanski et al., 2016.
The distribution of income among households is also a key variable
to consider, as it affects spending decisions. According to the keynesian
theory of consumption, the wealthier an individual is, the lower the marginal
propensity to consume is. This means that an increase in top-percentile net
wealth will lead to a smaller change in consumption if the same increase had
occurred in the low-percentile net wealth, which is made of households with a
high marginal propensity to consume. Given that stock market participation
is also linked to income and net wealth, rising equity prices spurred by the
conduct of monetary policy have distributional effects. The results from
the Household Financial and Consumption Survey (HFCS) conducted by
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the ECB show that among households in the lowest quintile of the income
distribution, only 2.2% own publicly traded shares, in contrast to 24.4% in the
top quintile (ECB, 2013). Unfortunately, no other HFCS reports are available
and so it becomes almost impossible to evaluate whether the ECB QE have
widened the distribution of income within and across euro area countries.
However, the BIS estimated the impact of unconventional monetary policies
over the composition of households’ balance sheets by means of a simulation.
The conclusions are that wealth inequality - measured as the ratio of the net
wealth of richer to poorer households - has increased in most countries since
the great financial crisis. On the asset side, equity and housing have been
the most important drivers of inequality. Since 2010, high equity returns
have been the main driver of faster growth of net wealth at the top of the
distribution, whereas fixed income assets - bonds and deposits - seem to have
affected wealth inequality only in the trough of the recession between 2009
and 2010, and then again since 2012. By focusing on portfolio rebalancing,
unconventional monetary policies have had a significant effec on the dynamics
of wealth inequality through changes in equity returns and house prices. A
low interest environment is likely to have encouraged a search for yield, which
goes hand in hand with riskier assets (Domanski et al., 2016).
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Conclusions
There’s a lady who’s sure
All that glitters is gold
And she’s buying a stairway to heaven
When she gets there she knows
If the stores are all closed
With a word she can get what she came for
Led Zeppelin, “Stairway to Heaven” (1971)
As the lady that was buying a stairway to heaven in famous song
by the Led Zeppelin, not all that glitters is gold. The same could be said by
looking at the unconventional monetary policies implemented by the ECB
over the past years. Those policies have been quite delusional at best. The
average euro-area GDP growth has not took off yet, and most economies
are still experiencing dismaying economic performances. Investment, a ma-
jor component of aggregate demand, is weak and not recovering. Industrial
production has dramatically plummeted so that de-industrialisation has be-
come a key concern for countries which had a strong manufacturing activity
until a few years ago. As a result, inflation was dormant if not falling be-
low zero. Given the low level of confidence, firms and households prefer to
hoard money or use it to pay debt rather than invest and consume. Even
if borrowing is now widely convenient, lending is so depressed that banks
need to rely on a different business model in order to make a profit. All
these negative trends put the European financial system under strain, so
that monetary policies can only partially relieve it. The successful avoidance
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of financial panic episodes such as the sovereign bond crisis that erupted in
2011 is proof of the central bank’s ability in restoring markets’ confidence.
However, one must bear in mind that excessive emphasis on monetary stim-
ulus may be transformed into market euphoria which in principle generates
a greater willingness to borrow. Although domestic borrowing has been kept
roughly constant by insufficient aggregate demand, cross-border lending is
rising again and could put under huge stress the monetary union. European
integration was based on financial integration with the belief that Euro-area
economies will converge to a sustainable growth path. The prerequisite for
such convergence was freedom of capital movements, so that financial flows
between Member states are now completely unrestrained.4 Markets had to
be convinced that lending money to a German citizen is the same of lend-
ing to a Spanish or a Greek firm. In other words, risk should have been
equal for each euro-priced sovereign bond and so the interest rate set by the
ECB had to fit every member state of the euro area. However, the same
monetary policy can have very different effects depending on the economic
structure of the country considered, which is still very different nowadays.
In fact, financial integration accentuated those structural divergences that
the common currency should have annihilated (O’Connell, 2015; Ostry et
al., 2016). The result of a one-size-fits-all monetary policy was translated
into a financial illusion by which every euro-area country’s sovereign bonds
could be considered to be safe assets. At the same time, only the possibility
of accumulating TARGET2 imbalances keeps out entire economies from the
risk of a default. This is feasible as long as the ECB is willing to provide
liquidity in exchange for collateral from the peripheral countries. Establish-
4Capital movements were fully liberalised in a first step by Council Directive
88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988, which scrapped all remaining restrictions on capital move-
ments between residents of the Member States as of 1 July 1990. The Maastricht Treaty of
European Union (TEU) introduced free movement of capital as a Treaty freedom. Today,
Article 63 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits all
restrictions on the movement of capital and payments between Member States, as well
as between Member States and third countries. On 30 September 2015, the Commission
adopted an action plan setting out a list of key measures to implement the Capital Mar-
kets Union (CMU), a plan of the European Commission to mobilise capital in Europe by
achieving a true single market for capital that would link savings with growth.
103
ing which is the upper bound to the amount of debt that would inevitably
be piled up as signalled by financial accounts deficits is a very difficult task
to accomplish. A change in the eligibility criteria operated by the European
monetary authorities could be enough to throw into economic depression an
entire economy, as it was the case with Greece during last summer.
∗ ∗ ∗
Instead of relying on monetary policy for boosting production and
circulation of real resources, Euro-area countries should fight the fear of debt
(Toporowski, 2013) by abandoning those same policies that created it - that is
to say, austerity and not profligacy. The only way by which monetary policy
could become effective is by restoring its natural counterpart - i.e., fiscal pol-
icy. Interest rates are so low that should Euro-area economies deplete their
government surpluses, they will be able to issue sovereign bonds with cheap
servicing cost. Asset purchase programmes such as the quantitative easing
are likely to be subject to diminishing returns. The longer the central bank
continue to buy assets, the lower is the impact on the financial system and
the more difficult is to elaborate an exit strategy. On the contrary, long-run
fiscal multipliers are greater than unity, meaning that public spending has
increasing returns. The effect is stronger during abnormal circumstances - in
particular when the economy is in a severe downturn or if the use and/or the
transmission of monetary policy are impaired, as in the case at the zero lower
bound (Batini et al., 2014). This suggests that had the more than e2 tril-
lions of ECB liquidity be invested in gross capital formation, euro area GDP
would have augmented by a multiple of that amount. One of the reasons why
all the liquidity injected did not translated into economic growth is because
changes in the official rate of interest and open market operations affect the
rate of substitution of long-term financing for short-term financing. Thus,
monetary policy influences financing decisions, but these are only partially
related to spending decisions (Toporowski, 2016). National income variables
such as output, employment and investment are instead directly linked to
current and future orders of goods and services. According to the secular
stagnation theory, the official interest rate should accommodate the falling
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natural rate of interest. In order to do so, central banks have to rely on esti-
mates of unobserved variables such as the equilibrium real rate itself (Borio
and Disyatat, 2014). Typical output gap forecasts released by the IMF and
by the European Commission in the year during the great financial crisis
were often downwardly revised, implying that these estimates are highly un-
certain and strongly model-dependent. Indeed, the choice of the theoretical
framework is important. Whereas mainstream models assume that money
and finance are neutral for the output path in the long run, the bust of
the credit bubble preceding the crisis showed that financing decisions have
long-lasting effects on economic fundamentals. Leverage can amplify cyclical
fluctuations while financial conditions affects decision to invest (ibidem). The
increasing burden of private debt may play a role in growth rates constantly
falling short of predictions, too. Especially for developed economies, more
finance does not necessarily lead to faster real GDP growth. As Cecchetti
and Kharroubi show, from 2005 to 2010 the ratio of Irish private credit to
GDP more than doubled, growing 16.9% per year. By contrast, over the
five years from 1995 to 2000, it grew at a more modest average annual rate
of 7.7%. This 9.2 percentage point difference has resulted in a productivity
slow-down over 2005-2010 of 0.8 percentage points per year compared to the
period 1995-2000. This accounts for around 30% of the 2.9 percentage point
drop in productivity growth (from 3.3% a.r. to 0.4% a.r.) that occurred over
this period (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012).
As open economies generally show a lower fiscal multiplier than
closed ones, the fiscal stimulus would be more effective if implemented by
each Euro-area country although with different emphasis. Given the positive
marginal propensity of imports with respect to income, the burden placed
on those economies experiencing a current account deficit is greater than the
cost to be paid by countries exhibiting a current account surplus. With-
out the possibility of implementing protectionist and interventionist trade
policies, the only way to avoid excessive build-up of TARGET2 imbalances
would be to keep aggregate demand under control in countries with a cur-
rent account deficit. This was exactly the main rationale for requiring GIPSI
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countries5 to adopt fiscal consolidation. In some of them the balance of
trade was successfully reverted from a deficit to a surplus mainly via lower
imports. The price to be paid for having completed homeworks assigned by
the ECB was higher unemployment, stagnant when not falling real wages
and almost zero investment. Those same countries could have implemented
expansionary fiscal policy. Although the introduction of the Macroeconomic
Imbalance Procedure was devised to avoid excessive trade imbalances 6 there
is no established financial limit in running a trade deficit as long the ECB is
willing to accept collateral from any euro-area institution, be it in the ‘core’
or in the ‘periphery’. Given the technical feasibility of progressive policies,
not having implemented them has to be seen as a purely a political deci-
sion. However, without the possibility of fiscal transfers among the member
states of the European monetary union, trade balance deficits would likely
become a structural problem that should be addressed by a revival in indus-
trial policy. Building a competitive industry should therefore become one of
the primary objectives for those countries experiencing high unemployment
rates (Kaldor, 1966).
Some of the above difficulties could be partially solved by financing
investment projects through the emission of bonds by the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB), as is somewhat being done by the Investment Plan for
Europe adopted in November 2014. The plan aims to mobilise at least e315
billion in additional investment, but the resources collected from both pub-
lic and private institutions via the European Fund for Strategic Investment
(EFSI) amount to e20.4 billion so far. The European Commission expects
that overall investment will add to e115.7 billion, which implies a crowd-in
effect of more than 5.5 times. This is an overly-optimistic estimate, as fiscal
5Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland.
6Art. 17 of the regulation No. 1176/2011 of 16 November 2011 on the prevention
and correction of macroeconomic imbalances states that “Given vulnerabilities and the
magnitude of the adjustment required, the need for policy action is particularly pressing
in Member States showing persistently large current-account deficits and competitiveness
losses. Furthermore, in Member States that accumulate large current-account surpluses,
policies should aim to identify and implement measures that help strengthen their domestic
demand and growth potential.”
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multipliers for the entire Euro-area are above unity by just some percentage
points. The so called Juncker plan relies too much on private entrepreneur-
ship and too little on the role that the public sector could play in kick-starting
growth through a varieties of economic policies that are judged too risky and
poorly rewarding by the private sector. Mission oriented policies such as
investing in radical innovation and tackling societal changes require the pub-
lic sector to think beyond its classical role of fixing market failures. Rather
than pumping liquidity into the financial system with the hope that it will
translated in capital investment, the fiscal aspect of unconventional mone-
tary policy should be took over by state investment banks to which both
a countercyclical and a developmental mandate is assigned (Mazzucato and
Penna, 2014). Again, this would likely encounter resistance in the political
sphere.
Recent discussions about the so called helicopter money7 show that
central banks are now seriously considering to test the limits of unconven-
tional monetary policy so to avoid the political deadlock. There is no agree-
ment on how money can be channelled into the real economy faster than
the quantitative easing has done so far. Bernanke suggests it can be imple-
mented via transfers to households and businesses via a tax cut coupled with
incremental purchases of government debt, so that the tax cut is in effect
financed by money creation (Bernanke, 2003). Turner proposes overt money
finance of increased fiscal deficits as an effective way to stimulate aggregate
demand (Turner, 2015). Skidelsky resurrects an idea originally elaborated
by Silvio Gesell, a Swiss businessman who claimed that giving cash directly
to households would have increased spending only if a tax on unspent money
is introduced (Skidelsky, 2016; Skidelsky and Desai, 2016). This last pro-
posal echoes the one labelled as quantitative easing for the people, according
to which the central bank should sign a check for each citizen (Muellbauer,
2014). Whatever the meaning attached to the money dropped by an heli-
7“Let us suppose now that one day a helicopter flies over this community and drops an
additional $1,000 in bills from the sky, which is, of course, hastily collected by members
of the community. Let us suppose further that everyone is convinced that this is a unique
event which will never be repeated.” (Friedman, 1969)
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copter, the result on the balance sheet of currency recipient is that the net
worth of the recipient increases. This is different from the result obtained
through open market operations or via lending by the central bank, as these
measures are simply a swap of financial assets. In the first case, the asset
seller will see her securities diminish while deposits will be raised by the same
amount. Both operations take place on the asset side so there is no change
in liabilities. The bank in which the asset seller has her account will have to
find reserves in order to increase the value of deposits. In the second case,
non-banks will see their deposits rise but they will have to repay the loan
made by the central bank. What happens in the banks’ balance sheet is
the same as in the previous case. If instead the central bank will lend the
money directly to banks, reserve balances will increase as much as debt to the
central bank does. On the contrary, the effects of a fiscal deficit run by the
government are very different. Private sector’s overall balance sheet will grow
because deposits and net worth have increased by the same amount. Bank-
ing sector’s balance sheet will follow by increasing both reserve balances and
deposits (Fullwiler, 2015). To all intents and purposes, helicoptered money
is a fiscal operation, not a monetary one. It might also be a hazardous one,
as it could result in interest rates permanently at zero (Borio et al., 2016).
The tune will come to the ECB at last, as it is buying a stairway to heaven.
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